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02-658 Alaska Dep't of Environmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 298 F.3d 814, 54 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1961)
Environmental Protection Agency acted within its authority under Clean Air Act when, based on
its finding that state environmental agency provided inadequate justification for its statutorily
required determination as to best available control technology, EPA issued enforcement orders
that effectively invalidated prevention-of-significant-deterioration permit that had been issued by
state agency in order to allow construction of likely pollutant-emitting source.
Question Presented: Did Ninth Circuit err in upholding EPA's assertion of authority to second-
guess permitting decision made by state of Alaska--which had been delegated permitting
authority under Clean Air Act--in conflict with decisions of this court and other federal courts of
appeals establishing division of federal-state jurisdiction under act and similar statutory
programs?
State of ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.
Teck Cominco Alaska Incorporated, Petitioner,
v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.
Teck Cominco Alaska Incorporated, Petitioner,
v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.
Teck Cominco Alaska Incorporated, Petitioner,
V.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Carol M. Browner, Administrator,
and Chuck Clarke, Regional Administrator, Region 10, of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 13, 2001.
Submission Vacated March 27, 2001.
Resubmitted July 30, 2002.
Filed July 30, 2002.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge.
The Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation ("ADEC") and Teck Cominco
Alaska, Inc. ("Cominco") petition for review
of three enforcement orders entered by the
United States environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), which effectively
invalidated a Prevention of Significant
Deterioration ("PSD") permit issued by
ADEC to Cominco. Petitioners challenge
the EPA's authority to issue these orders,
and argue that the EPA abused its discretion
in finding that ADEC's Best Available
Control Technology ("BACT")
determination did not comply with the
requirements of the Clean Air Act and
Alaska's State Implementation Plan ("SIP").
We find that the EPA acted within its
authority and, further, that it did not abuse
its discretion.
I. Background
The Clean Air Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §
7401-7671, establishes a program for
controlling and improving the nation's air
quality through a system of shared federal
and state responsibility. The Act requires
states to submit for the EPA's approval a
state implementation plan that provides for
attainment and maintenance of the national
ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS")
promulgated by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
The Act's Prevention of Significant
Deterioration program controls the level of
degradation in "clean air areas" of the nation
by requiring a pollutant-emitting source to
obtain a permit before construction. See 42
U.S.C. § 7470-7492. In implementing the
PSD program and permitting process, states
can either operate within the federal PSD
program, in which the EPA is the PSD
permit issuer, or include a PSD program
within their own EPA-approved state
implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(2)(C), 7471.
... Under Alaska's State Implementation
Plan, which the EPA accepted as meeting
the Act's requirements in 1983, Alaska,
through the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation, is the PSD
permit issuer.... For new and modified
sources, the Alaska SIP requires "a
demonstration that the proposed [emissions
control] limitation represents the best
available control technology" before ADEC
will issue a permit. Alaska Admin. Code
tit. 18, § 50.310(d)(3) (1997).
Cominco operates the Red Dog Mine
facility ("the Mine"), a major producer of
zinc concentrates, in partnership with the
Northwest Arctic Native Association, an
Alaska corporation. The Mine is
approximately 100 miles north of the Arctic
Circle and about five miles west of the
Noatak National Preserve. The closest
residential communities are the native
villages of Kivalina and Noatak.
Due to its remote location, the Mine
requires an independent, on-site power
source. The current power supply for the
Mine consists of six diesel-fired Wartsila
5000-watt generators, labeled "MG- "
through "MG-6," which were constructed
under a 1988 PSD permit. In April 1996,
Cominco began its Production Rate Increase
("PRI") project to boost the Mine's output of
zinc and zinc concentrates. Cominco
determined it needed more electricity at the
Mine to power the additional mining
equipment.
In June 1998, Cominco submitted an
application to ADEC for a new PSD permit,
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requesting permission to increase the
amount of nitrogen oxides ("NOx"), a
regulated air pollutant, from its MG-5
generator. Cominco's application proposed
the use of "Low NOx" as BACT for MG-5.
Low NOx is a process that uses high-
combustion air temperatures to better
atomize toxic particles, thereby reducing the
amount of NOx released into the
environment. A review by ADEC, however,
reached the contrary conclusion that
Selective Catalytic Reduction ("SCR"), a
process in which exhaust is injected with
ammonia or urea and then combined with a
catalyst, was BACT for MG-5.
Cominco responded by amending its
application in April 1999. As an alternative
to installing SCR on MG-5, Cominco
volunteered to install the less costly Low
NOx technology on all six of its existing
generators, including those not subject to
BACT standards, and on a proposed seventh
generator, "MG- 17."
In its May 4, 1999 Preliminary Technical
Analysis Report, ADEC accepted Cominco's
proposal because it would reduce the total
NOx output from the Mine to a level
comparable to that which would result were
SCR installed in only the MG-5 and MG-17
generators.
In July 1999, the EPA entered the
discussion over Cominco's application at the
urging of the National Park Service, which
had expressed concern that the "[n]itrogen
oxide emissions ... could affect vegetation at
Cape Krusenstern National Monument and
Noatak National Preserve." In a letter to
ADEC, the EPA stated that SCR was the
best available control technology for the
MG-5 and MG-17 generators, and that "the
PSD program does not allow the imposition
of a limit that is less stringent than BACT
even if the equivalent emission reductions
are obtained by imposing new controls on
other emission units."
On September 3, 1999, ADEC issued a
Final Technical Analysis Report and permit
decision, concluding that SCR was not
economically feasible and that Low NOx
was instead BACT. The EPA responded
with a review of ADEC's report, asserting
that ADEC's cost-effectiveness estimate for
SCR was "well within the range that the
EPA considers reasonable," and that
Cominco had not adequately demonstrated
why SCR was economically infeasible.
ADEC, Cominco, and the EPA met to
discuss the pending PSD permit, agreeing to
install Low NOx on MG-1, MG-3, MG-4,
and MG-5, but without agreeing on BACT
for MG-17.
After further unsuccessful negotiations, the
EPA issued a "Finding of Noncompliance
Order" on December 10, 1999, stating that
ADEC's authorization of Cominco's
construction and installation of new
equipment was not in compliance with the
Clean Air Act and the Alaska SIP. Pursuant
to Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) and 7477, the EPA
ordered ADEC to withhold issuance of
Cominco's PSD permit.
Later that same day, however, in disregard
of the EPA's order, ADEC issued the PSD
permit along with a second Final Technical
Analysis Report.
On February 8, 2000, the EPA sent a letter
to ADEC with a formal finding that the
December 10, 1999 report and PSD permit
failed to comply with federal and state PSD
requirements. On the same day, the EPA
issued a second order to Cominco
preventing the company from beginning
construction on the MG-17 generator until
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Cominco had demonstrated to the EPA's
satisfaction compliance with the Act and the
SIP.
The EPA's third order, dated March 7,
2000, modified the February 8, 2000 order
to allow Cominco to engage in summer-
dependent construction activities.
On April 25, 2000, the EPA withdrew its
December 10, 1999 order prohibiting ADEC
from issuing the permit. In an
accompanying letter, however, the EPA
emphasized that its findings of
noncompliance in the December 10, 1999
and February 8, 2000 orders remained
unchanged.
ADEC and Cominco petition this court for
review of the December 10, 1999 Finding of
Noncompliance and Order; the February 8,
2000 Administrative Order; and the March
7, 2000 Amended Administrative Order.
Petitioners claim that the EPA exceeded its
authority by issuing enforcement orders
invalidating ADEC's issuance of Cominco's
PSD permit, and that ADEC acted within its
discretion when making its BACT
determination.
III. Authority of the EPA
We agree with the EPA that the plain text,
structure, and history of the Act compel the
conclusion that the administrative orders fell
within the EPA's enforcement and oversight
authority.
Under the traditional method of statutory
construction, the interpretation of a statute
"begin[s] with the plain meaning of its
language." In re Bonner Mall Partnership,
2 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir.1993). "Our task is
to give effect to the will of Congress, and
where its will has been expressed in
reasonably plain terms, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
The EPA's enforcement powers are outlined
in Section 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(a)(5), and Section 167, 42 U.S.C. §
7477, of the Act.
Section 113(a)(5) provides:
Whenever, on the basis of any available
information, the Administrator finds that a
State is not acting in compliance with any
requirement or prohibition of the chapter
relating to the construction of new sources
or the modification of existing sources, the
Administrator may--
(A) issue an order prohibiting the
construction or modification of any major
stationary source in any area to which such
requirement applies;
(B) issue an administrative penalty order
in accordance with [42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)],
or
(C) bring a civil action under [42 U.S.C. §
7413(b)].
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5). The referenced
'chapter" includes the PSD permit program
in "Part C--Prevention of Significant
Deterioration of Air Quality." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475; H.R.Rep. No. 101-490(I), pt. 10, at
391 (1990) (Section 113(a)(5) "authorizes
enforcement actions where a State is not
acting in compliance with any requirement
of Part C or Part D of Title I.").
Under Section 167, the Administrator "shall
... take such measures, including issuance of
an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as
necessary to prevent the construction or
modification of a major emitting facility
which does not conform to the requirements
of this part...." 42 U.S.C. § 7477. "This part"
refers to Part C, which establishes the PSD
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program.
The PSD program is implemented through a
permitting system for new and modified
'major emitting facilities" in clean air areas.
42 U.S.C. § 7475, 7479(1). To receive a
permit, the applicant must fulfill the
"preconstruction requirement" that a
"proposed facility [be] subject to the best
available control technology for each
pollutant subject to regulation...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a)(4). Thus, subjecting a facility to
BACT is both a "requirement ... of the
chapter relating to the construction of new
sources or the modification of existing
sources" under Section 113(a)(5), and a
"requirement[ ] of this part" under Section
167 .... BACT is defined in Section 169(3)
as
an emission limitation based on the
maximum degree of reduction of each
pollutant subject to regulation under this
chapter emitted from or which results from
any major emitting facility, which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for
such facility....
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). Here, ADEC, as the
"permitting authority," made the initial
BACT decision. Because the EPA based its
orders on the finding that ADEC had not
complied with the BACT requirement, the
orders were authorized by the plain language
of Section 113(a)(5), as "order[s] prohibiting
the construction or modification of any
major stationary source in any area to which
such requirement applies," and of Section
167, as orders "necessary to prevent the
construction or modification of a major
emitting facility which does not conform to
the requirements of this part."
The structure and legislative history of the
Act further support the EPA's authority to
issue the enforcement orders. Since the
original Clean Air Act of 1963, state and
local governments have had "primary
responsibility" for "the prevention and
control of air pollution at its so.... Following
disappointing state response to air pollution
concerns, Congress has consistently
increased over time federal authority in
pollution control.
Thus, although the state has discretion to
make BACT determinations as the
permitting authority, the Act provides for
EPA enforcement when the state issues a
permit based on an improper
determination.... Therefore, based upon the
plain language and the legislative history of
the Act and amendments to it, we hold that
the EPA has the ultimate authority to decide
whether the state has complied with the
BACT requirements of the Act and the state
SIP.
ADEC and Cominco contend that the EPA
exceeded its authority in issuing the three
administrative orders predicated on a finding
that ADEC's BACT determination was
inadequately justified. They argue that
because Section 169(3) gives ADEC, the
"permitting authority," discretion to
determine BACT, the EPA lacked authority
to veto ADEC's judgment based on a mere
difference of opinion as to which technology
was BACT.
This argument is without merit because
neither Section 113(a)(5) nor Section 167
contains any exemption for requirements
that involve the state's exercise of discretion.
Nothing in the BACT definition of Section
169(3) limits the EPA's authority. It does
not follow from the placement of initial
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responsibility with the state permitting
authority that its decision is thereby
insulated from the oversight and
enforcement authority assigned to the EPA
in other sections of the statute.
Petitioners further contend that the EPA's
authority extends only to determining
whether ADEC satisfied what they term
"objective requirements" listed in the Act
and the SIP. However, it is not clear what
Petitioners mean by "objective
requirements," as opposed to, presumably,
discretionary requirements. Instead of
defining such requirements, Petitioners offer
a non-exhaustive list, including: the
requirement of a PSD permit, the inclusion
of a BACT determination in the permit,
compliance with federally set limits on
emissions, and consideration of energy,
environmental, economic, and other costs.
Whereas failure to comply with any of the
foregoing objective requirements would
justify the EPA's issuance of enforcement
orders under Sections 113(a)(5) and 167,
Petitioners argue, the state's BACT
determination itself is not subject to EPA
approval or veto.
In support of this distinction, Petitioners
cite United States v. Solar Turbines, Inc.,
732 F.Supp. 535 (M.D.Pa.1989), in which
the district court analyzed whether a source's
actions constituted a violation of the Act:
[A] violation is to be assessed against
objective standards, namely the source's
failure to apply for a permit or receive a
permit prior to construction; failure to
supply information requested of it by the
issuing authority, or failure to comply with
specific quantifiable air quality standards
or restrictions on emission levels.
Id. at 539. However, this case sheds no
light on Petitioners' argument because it
examined the requirements that a source
must meet under the Act. Here, the question
presented is what requirements the state
must meet.
In a move that seems to undermine their
position, Petitioners also quote a Legal
Opinion by the EPA's Office of General
Counsel to define what they mean by
"objective requirements:"
[I]n the case of a decision applying best
available control technology (BACT)
under Section 165(a)(4) for PSD, if a state
has met all procedural norms, considered
all available control technologies, and
given a reasoned justification of the basis
for its decision, EPA has no grounds on
which to challenge a final substantive state
decision that does not violate such
objective standards.
(emphasis added).
As the emphasized portion demonstrates,
this Opinion actually supports the EPA's
authority to determine the reasonableness or
adequacy of the state's justification for its
decision, which is exactly what the EPA did
here. The cover letter to the December 10,
1999 Finding of Noncompliance and Order
stated the EPA's belief that:
ADEC's own analysis supports the
determination that BACT is selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) ... ADEC's
decision in the proposed permit therefore
is both arbitrary and erroneous.... [T]he
State's record reflects that the cost-
effectiveness and the collateral issues of
energy, environmental, or economic
impacts, and other costs, do not justify
failure to select SCR as BACT in this case.
Whatever Petitioners mean by "objective
requirements," they must concede that the
provision of a reasoned justification is one
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of them. We conclude, therefore, that the
EPA had the authority to issue findings and
orders on the ground that the State failed to
provide an adequate justification for its
BACT decision.
IV. Validity of the Orders
Petitioners alternatively argue that the EPA
erred in finding that ADEC was not in
compliance because ADEC's BACT
determination fulfilled all requirements of
the Act. The EPA maintains that ADEC's
determination that Low NOx was BACT
was "nothing short of incomprehensible,
unreasoned, and unsupported."
Under the Act, we may reverse a final
action by the EPA if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. United States EPA, 217 F.3d 1246,
1248 (9th Cir.2000). Upon review of the
administrative record, we conclude that the
EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
issuing its Findings of Noncompliance and
Orders prohibiting construction of the MG-
17 generator until ADEC produced a valid
PSD permit.
... ADEC's December 10 Technical Analysis
Report rejected SCR because it would have
adverse economic impacts on the Red Dog
Mine. The report states that there are several
situations in which a permitting authority
can reject a control option for economic
considerations: (1) when the applicant, i.e.,
Cominco, shows that the costs of the control
are disproportionately high compared to the
cost of control in recent permit decisions;
(2) when the cost-effectiveness of the
control is outside the range of costs being
borne by similar sources in recent BACT
determinations; and (3) when the applicant
shows the cost of the control option will
cause adverse economic impact to the
facility.
ADEC's report demonstrates, however, that
none of these situations were present. As to
the first situation, the report reveals that
there were no recent permit decisions
involving BACT determinations for diesel
engines used as primary power generators.
As to the second, the cost-effectiveness of
recent NOx control BACT decisions ranged
from $0 to $7,000 per ton of NOx removed.
According to ADEC's estimate, the cost-
effectiveness of SCR was $2,100 per ton of
NOx removed, a cost well within the
applicable range.
Finally, ADEC attempted to determine
whether the costs of SCR would be
excessive by analogizing the costs of the
MG-17 generator to the costs of other
electric utilities. ADEC began with the
assumption that SCR for MG-17 would cost
3 cents per kilowatt-hour. It reasoned that
if Cominco "did not have a powerhouse, it
would probably buy power from a rural
Alaska utility. From a cursory review, it
appears that the average cost of electricity in
rural-Alaska is approximately 150 per
kilowatt hour." Because a 30 increase
would "be equivalent to a 20% increase in
the electric rate of the facility," ADEC
concluded that "this is a disproportionate
cost increase when viewed as an electric
utility."
This rationale is unfounded, however,
because Cominco does not, in fact, buy
power from an electric utility. Therefore,
the use of the 150 figure is not justified.
ADEC itself acknowledges the flimsiness of
its own hypothetical in the report:
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Another perhaps better way to determine if
the cost of BACT is excessive, is for the
applicant to present detailed financial
information showing its effect on the
operation. However, the applicant did not
present this information. Therefore, no
judgment can be made as to the impact of
a $2.1 million control cost on the
operation, profitability, and
competitiveness of the Red Dog Mine.
ADEC's report demonstrates that Cominco
failed to show that any of the situations in
which a control option can be rejected for
cost considerations was applicable. Rather
than concluding, logically, that Cominco
had failed to show that SCR could be
eliminated, ADEC instead invented its own
reason for the economic infeasibility of
SCR. ADEC described the Mine's
"dramatic" reversal of unemployment rates
in its borough:
Before the Mine opened in 1990, borough
wages were well below state average
wages.... The Mine now provides high
paying year round employment. ...
Cominco's contractors, vendors, and
wages have boosted the borough's private
sector economy.
... With government support and
endorsement of Cominco's operations,
including the Production Rate Increase
Project, the Red Dog Mine will continue
to influence and benefit the residents and
economy of this region.
ADEC concluded that it had chosen, as the
"foremost consideration to judge economic
impacts of SCR," the "direct cost of SCR
technology and its relationship to retaining
the Mine's world competitiveness as it
relates to community socioeconomic
impacts." To "support Cominco's[PRI
Project] ... and its contributions to the
region," ADEC rejected SCR "based on
excessive economic cost--$2.9 million
capital cost, with annualized costs
approaching $635,000." The report fails to
explain how the costs of SCR would affect
the Mine's world competitiveness or why the
capital cost is excessive.
ADEC's apparent motivation for the
elimination of SCR--appreciation for
Cominco's contribution to the local
economy--is not an accepted justification in
the top-down approach. Worse still, it is
uncomfortably reminiscent of one of the
very reasons Congress granted EPA
enforcement authority--to protect states from
industry pressure to issue ill-advised
permits. See S.Rep. No. 95-127, at 136.
Because ADEC's report shows that (1)
Cominco failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that SCR was economically
infeasible; and (2) ADEC failed to provide a
reasoned justification for its elimination of
SCR as a control option, the EPA did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding
that ADEC abused its discretion by making
an internally inconsistent and unreasonable
BACT determination. The petition for
review is therefore
DENIED.
348
FEDERALISM ARISES IN CLEAN AIR ACT CASE; SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE
IF EPA'S AUTHORITY SUPERSEDES A STATE'S
The Connecticut Law Tribune
May 26, 2003
Lewis Goldshore and Marsha Wolf
On Feb. 24, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court,
which is sharply divided regarding
environmental issues, agreed to hear Alaska
Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., a
case that involves the proper division of
authority between the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and the
states respecting the implementation of the
Clean Air Act.
The differences in the justices' perspective
were illustrated in two recent Clean Water
Act decisions. Earlier this term, in Borden
Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, the court deadlocked over
whether deep ripping resulted in the
discharge of a pollutant under the CWA.
And in a 5-4 ruling in 2001, Solid Waste
Agency of No. Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the court found that the
Army Corps of Engineers' migratory bird
rule exceeded its CWA authority.
The question currently before the court is
whether the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals erroneously upheld the EPA's
authority to supersede a State of Alaska
permitting decision where the state had been
delegated CAA permitting authority.
From time to time, disputes between the
EPA and the states arise, but they are
ordinarily resolved without resorting to the
courts. The disagreement here proved to be
irreconcilable and the stakes were high
enough to cause the state and the permittee
to seek judicial review of the EPA's rulings.
The two petitioners in the 9th Circuit were
the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation and Teck Cominco Alaska,
Inc. The company operates the world's
largest zinc mine in a remote portion of
Alaska, some 100 miles north of the Arctic
Circle and approximately five miles from a
national preserve. The closest residential
areas are two sparsely populated native
villages.
Because of its remoteness, the mining
operations require an independent on- site
power source. In 1988, the state
environmental agency issued a "prevention
of significant deterioration" permit to
Cominco authorizing the use of six diesel-
fired 5,000-watt generators. As the company
sought to expand its facility, it required
additional electricity to power new
equipment. Due to the increase in the
resulting air emissions, a new state-issued
prevention of significant deterioration
permit was needed.
A few months later, the EPA entered the
picture. The National Park Service was
concerned that additional emissions could
adversely affect vegetation at a nearby
national monument and preserve. At this
point, the EPA advised the state
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environmental agency that only one, highly
expensive process would be acceptable. The
state disagreed, and allowed a permit for a
different emissions system. The EPA
ordered Cominco to halt operations, and
asserted that the State of Alaska had
overstepped its bounds.
Circuit Court's Ruling
The court found that the plain language of
the enforcement powers granted to the EPA
in the Clean Air Act, as well as the act's
structure and legislative history, authorized
the EPA's orders.
The 9th Circuit further reasoned that the
CAA provides that, to obtain a permit under
the prevention of significant deterioration
program, the applicant must satisfy the
"preconstruction requirement" that a
,'proposed facility [be] subject to the best
available control technology for each
pollutant subject to regulation."
The 9th Circuit also found support for this
conclusion in the CAA's structure and
legislative history. It pointed to a series of
amendments that increased federal authority,
vis-A-vis the states, over air pollution
control. It noted how Congress recognized
the pressure brought upon states to relax air
quality standards by local industries
threatening to relocate to more permissive
jurisdictions.
The court also observed that amendments
extended the EPA's enforcement authority,
including instances in which a state failed to
enforce state implementation plan
provisions, permit requirements or "any
requirement or prohibition" of the CAA as
to new or modified sources. Further, the
court concluded that the EPA was
authorized to issue its orders on the ground
that the state did not provide sufficient
justification for its decision.
In sum, based on the CAA's plain language
and legislative history, the court held "that
the EPA has the ultimate authority to decide
whether the state has complied
with.. .requirements of the Act and the state
SIP [state implementation plan]."
The second issue before the court was
whether the EPA had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in finding that the state
environmental agency's determination was
unreasonable. After examining the record,
particularly the state's technical analysis
report, the court concluded that the EPA's
actions were valid.
Core Issue
Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to
hear the case, Alaska Gov. Frank
Murkowski issued a press release in which
he explained the state's interest in this
matter: "We are committed to see this
dispute through this final chapter and we
hope to correct what we believe to be a
serious over-reaching of authority by the
EPA. We look forward to briefing and
arguing this important case before the
Supreme Court. Ten other states have
supported the Alaska petition to the
Supreme Court, and they will be our allies
as the court hears and decides this important
national issue on the rights and
responsibilities of each state to manage air
quality."
According to the press release: "This case
goes to the core roles and relationships
between EPA and the state. ... The ironic
aspect of the dispute, which the state intends
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to demonstrate to the Supreme Court, is that
the ADEC proposed permit would actually
have achieved greater overall protection of
air quality at the mine than EPA's preferred
permit."
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ALASKA AND THE RED DOG MINE BITE BACK AFTER THE EPA TIGHTENS THE
LEASH
The Legal Intelligencer
April 7, 2003
John P. Halfpenny
From a zinc mine in the Arctic Circle comes
a Supreme Court case that could
dramatically alter the balance of power
between the Environmental Protection
Agency and its state counterparts in
implementing and enforcing the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401. et seq. The case
could also have far-reaching effects on other
statutes that rely on "cooperative
federalism," the principle of shared federal-
state responsibility, whereby the federal
government sets standards and grants states
wide latitude in implementing and enforcing
them.
In July 2002, the 9th Circuit sided with the
EPA against the state of Alaska and held
that "the EPA has the ultimate authority to
decide whether the state has complied with
the [best available pollution control
technology] requirements of the [Clean Air]
Act," in issuing permits for the modification
or construction of air-pollutant emitting
facilities. Since then. Alaska and the Red
Dog Mine have sought Supreme Court
review of the 9th Circuit's decision in
Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (ADEC) v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814,
820 (9th Cir. 2002).
On Feb. 24, 2003, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation v. EPA
(ADEC), setting the stage for a classic battle
between state sovereignty and federal
oversight. The case also presents one of the
first opportunities for the Bush
Administration to present its environmental
views to the Supreme Court and ironically
given the administration's states-rights bias
puts it in the position of defending the EPA's
Clinton-era veto of a state's Clean Air Act
determination.
At issue in ADEC is the EPA's authority to
second-guess, and ultimately veto, the
decisions of state environmental agencies
based on a difference of opinion about what
constitutes the "best available pollution
control technology" for limiting pollutants in
'clean air" areas, such as Alaska. Because of
its potential impact on a wide array of laws
that rely on "cooperative federalism," the
clash between states' rights and federal
environmental oversight, and because it is
the Bush Administration's first major
environmental case, ADEC promises to be
one of the most closely watched cases of the
court's term.
THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act recently described as
an "experiment in federalism" in Michigan
v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
2001) - gives the states a large role in
controlling air pollution. In areas where
clean air standards have been achieved, the
act restricts the construction or modification
of a "major emitting facility" unless the
facility uses the "best available control
technology," as determined by the state, to
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limit emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
Alaska "is-a 'clean air area' under the Act
...." ADEC, 298 F.2d a!t 816.
The act defines "best available control
technology" as "an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of reduction
of each pollutant . emitted from . . . any
major emitting facility, which the permitting
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account energy, environmental, and
economic impacts and other costs,
determines is achievable for such facility
....." 42 U.S.C. at § 7479(3). The petition
states that the legislative history of the act
confirms the broad authority granted to the
states to determine the best available
technology for a particular source: "The
decision regarding the actual
implementation of best available technology
is a key one, and the committee places this
re!sponsibility with the State, to be
determined in a case-by-case judgment."
THE RED DOG MINE
The Red Dog Mine, located 100 miles
above the Arctic Circle, is a major producer
of zinc. Because of its remote location, the
mine requires its own energy source and
relies on six, diesel-fired, 5000-watt
electrical generators.
According to the brief, in 1998, the mine
applied to the ADEC for permission to
increase the amount of nitrogen oxides
(NOx), a regulated air pollutant, emitted
from one of its generators. In its application,
the mine proposed the use of "Low NOx" as
the best available pollution control
technology for its generator. "Low NOx is a
process that uses high-combustion air
temperatures to better atomize toxic
particles, thereby reducing the amount of
NOx released into the environment."
ADEC determined, however, that the best
available technology was not NOx but
Selective Catalytic Reduction, "a process in
which exhaust is injected with ammonia or
urea and then combined with a catalyst" to
reduce emissions.
In response to ADEC's determination, the
mine amended its application in April 1999.
In its amended application, as an alternative
to installing SCR technology on one
generator, the mine volunteered to install the
less costly NOx technology on all six of its
existing generators (including five not
subject to Alaska's determination) and on a
proposed seventh NOx generator.
In May 1999, ADEC accepted the mine's
proposal after determining that NOx
technology would reduce the total NOx
output to a level comparable to what would
result if the SCR technology were installed
on two of the generators. ADEC then
published its determination for public
comment and review.
THE EPA VETO
According to the petition for certiorari, the
EPA first weighed in with its opinion in July
1999, after the close of the public comment
period. The EPA, said ADEC in its petition,
contended that SCR and not Low NOx, was
the best available pollution control
technology.
The EPA further argued that the Clean Air
Act "does not allow the imposition of a limit
that is less stringent than [the best available
pollution controlling technology] even if the
equivalent emission reductions are obtained
by imposing new controls on other emission
units."
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On Dec. 10, 1999, the EPA issued a Finding
of Non-Compliance Order stating that
ADEC's authorization of the mine's
"installation of new equipment was not in
compliance with the Clean Air Act ....".
Despite the EPA's order, Alaska issued the
requested permit. In response, the EPA
issued orders preventing the mine from
constructing and installing the new
equipment. ADEC and the mine responded
to the EPA's orders by petitioning the 9th
Circuit for review. Specifically, they argued
that "the EPA exceeded its authority by
issuing enforcement orders invalidating [the
state's] issuance of [the] permit, and that [the
state] acted within its discretion when
making the [best available pollution control
technology] determination."
In its opinion, the 9th Circuit "agree[d] with
the EPA that ... the administrative orders fell
with the EPA's enforcement and oversight
authority." The 9th Circuit found that
"although the state has discretion to make
[best available pollution controlling
technology] determinations ..., the Act
provides for EPA enforcement when the
state issues a permit based on an improper
determination." (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). The court then held that the EPA has
the "ultimate authority" to decide whether
the state has complied with the act's best
available pollution control technology
requirements. In making this determination,
the court rejected ADEC's economic impact
and cost determinations.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
As ADEC argued in its petition for
certiorari, the 9th Circuit's decision appears
to contradict the Supreme Court's decision
in Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). In Train,
the court stated that the EPA "is plainly
charged by the Act with the responsibility
for setting the national ambient air
standards."
But, "[j]ust as plainly," the Train court
observed, the EPA "is relegated ... to a
secondary role in the process of determining
and enforcing the specific, source-by-source
emission ...." The Train court also stated that
the EPA has "no authority to question the
wisdom of a State's choices of emission
limitations if they are part of a plan which
satisfies the [Act's] standards." Train went
on to hold that "so long as the ultimate effect
of a State's choice of emission limitations is
in compliance with the national standards
for ambient air, the State is at liberty to
adopt whatever mix of emission limitations
it deems best suited to its particular
situation."
The 9th Circuit's decision in ADEC appears
to turn Train on its head and gives the EPA
the right to veto a state's determination
based on a difference of opinion regarding
the best available pollution-control
technology.
The 9th Circuit's decision also appears to
conflict with other circuit court decisions
upholding state authority to make
determinations similar to those implied in
the best available pollution control
technology provisions of the Clean Air Act.
. American Corn Growers Ass'n v. EPA,
291 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2002) upheld a states'
authority to determine the best available
retrofit technology under the Clean Air Act.
. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
323 (D.C. Cir. 1980) upheld state's authority
to make the best available pollution control
technology determination);
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. Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C.
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 116 F.3d
499 (1997) invalidated EPA regulation
requiring certain states to adopt particular
motor vehicle emissions standards.
. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650
F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981) held that the EPA
has no authority to "assume control of a
State's emission limitations mix once its
initial plan is approved."
. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742
F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1028) 7th Circuit
refused to permit the EPA to upset the Act's
"division of responsibilities."
As these decisions indicate, the District of
Columbia, 5th and 7th circuits have all
interpreted the Clean Air Act's "cooperative
federalism" as granting the states greater
autonomy and authority than the 9th Circuit.
Given the 9th Circuit's wide territorial
sweep such a disparity among the circuits
could have a wide-spread impact.
Given the Supreme Court's Train decision,
the wealth of other circuit court cases which
have reached contrary conclusions about the
distribution of power between the states and
the EPA, the 9th Circuit's historic rate of
reversal, and the present court's ideological
bent, the safe bet is that the 9th Circuit's
ADEC decision will be reversed.
Nonetheless, the case proves to be highly
interesting given its potential ramifications
for future Clean Air Act decisions and
because it presents the first major
environmental case to come before the court
during the Bush Administration.
John P. Halfpenny is a shareholder in the
litigation group of the Philadelphia office of
Klett Rooney Lieber & Schorling. His
practice focuses on complex commercial
litigation, primarily in the areas of
intellectual property and antitrust law.
Halfpenny is licensed in Pennsylvania and
California and is admitted to practice before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd and
9th circuits. He can be reached at
jphalfpenny@klettrooney.com.
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02-626 South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
Ruling Below: (11th Cir., 280 F.3d 1364, 53 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1929)
South Florida Water Management District's operation, in interest of flood prevention, of pump
station, which pumps water collected by canal--runoff from water basin and seepage through
levees--into water conservation area, is cause-in-fact of addition of pollutants to water
conservation area, because polluted waters from canal would not normally flow into water
conservation area, and thus, release of water caused by pump station's operation constitutes
addition of pollutants from point source, for which National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permit under Clean Water Act is required.
Question Presented: Does pumping of water by state water management agency that adds
nothing to water being pumped constitute "addition" of pollutant "from" point source triggering
need for NPDES permit under Clean Water Act?
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.
Friends of the Everglades, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
South Florida Water Management District, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
Decided Febuary 1, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians ("the Tribe")
and the Friends of the Everglades ("the
Friends") (together "Plaintiffs") brought a
citizen suit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
against the South Florida Water Management
District ("the Water District"). The suit alleges
that the Water District was violating the Clean
Water Act
by discharging pollutants from the S-9 pump
station into Water Conservation Area 3A
without a national pollution discharge
elimination system ("NPDES") permit.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court denied the Water
District's motion, granted Plaintiffs', and
enjoined the Water District from operating the
S-9 pump station without an NPDES permit.
The Water District appeals from the district
court's order declaring unlawful the Water
District's operation of the S-9 pump station
without an NPDES permit and from the
356
injunction prohibiting the same.'
I. BACKGROUND
The South Florida Water Management District
manages the Central & Southern Florida Flood
Control Project. This management is through
the operation of many levees, canals and water
impoundment areas. The areas now called the
C- 11 Basin and the Water Conservation Area-
3A ("WCA-3A") were historically part of the
Everglades. But, in the early 1900's, the Army
Corps of Engineers began digging the C-11
Canal to facilitate the draining of the western
portion of Broward County which is part of the
C-11 Basin. Then, in the 1950's, the Corps
constructed the L-37 and L-33 levees to create
WCA-3A to the west of the C-11 Basin and
completed construction of the S-9 pump station.
The C-11 Canal runs through the C-11 Basin
and collects water run-off from the Basin and
seepage through the levees from WCA-3A.
The S-9 pump station then pumps this water
through three pipes from the C-I1 Canal
through the L-37 and L-33 levees into WCA-3A
at a rate of 960 cubic feet per second per pipe.
Without the operation of the S-9 pump station,
the populated western portion of Broward
County would flood within days.2
The water which the C-1I Canal collects and
which the S-9 pump station conveys into the
WCA-3A contains pollutants. In particular,
this water contains higher levels of phosphorus
I The district court also concluded that Plaintiffs' claims
against Defendant were not barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Water District has not appealed
this ruling.
2 But for the construction of the L-33 and L-37 levees and
the C- II canal, water would flow as a sheet across WCA-
3A and the C-1I1 Basin in a southerly direction. Now,
because of the construction of these structures, water from
the C-Il Basin generally does not flow west into the
WCA-3A without the operation of S-9.
than that naturally occurring in WCA-3A. The
S-9 pump station, however, adds no pollutants
to the water which it conveys.
The district court concluded that, because the
waters collected by the C-I1 Canal contained
pollutants and this water would not flow into
WCA-3A without the operation of the S-9 pump
station, S-9 added pollutants to the WCA-3A in
violation of the CWA. On appeal, the Water
District contends that the district court erred as a
matter of law in concluding that S-9's
conveyance of water from the C- 11 Canal into
the WCA-3A constituted a discharge of
pollutants.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Pumping of Polluted Water
We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Plaintiffs de novo, applying the
same legal standard as the district court.
Hendrickson v. Ga. Power Co., 240 F.3d 966,
969 (11th Cir.2001). For summary judgment to
be proper, no genuine issue can exist on a
material fact; and the moving party must be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing the evidence,
we must draw all reasonable, factual inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. Carriers
Container Council, Inc. v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n,
896 F.2d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.1990).
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of
pollutants from a point source into navigable
waters without an NPDES permit. See 33
U.S.C. § § 1311, 1342. The "discharge of a
pollutant" is defined as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source." See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). No party
disputes that the S-9 pump station and, in
particular, the pipes from which water is
released constitute a point source3 or that the
3 A point source is defined to be "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe ... from which pollutants are or may be
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water released by the station contains pollutants.
Also, both parties agree that the C-Il Canal and
the WCA-3A constitute navigable waters. The
parties mainly dispute one legal issue: whether
the pumping of the already polluted water
constitutes an addition of pollutants to navigable
waters from a point source.
Relying on a line of hydroelectric-dam cases,
the Water District argues that no addition of
pollutants from a point source can occur unless
a point source adds pollutants to navigable
waters from the outside world. See Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175
(D.C.Cir.1982) (showing deference to EPA's
interpretation that "[an] addition from a point
source occurs only if the point source itself
physically introduces a pollutant into water from
the outside world"); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th
Cir.1988) (same).4 Under the Water District's
discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
In Gorsuch, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
gave deference to the EPA's position that, because
pollutants were the result of dam-induced water-quality
changes, a dam did not add pollutants from the outside
world and, thus, no NPDES permit was required for a
dam to release the water into a downstream river. Id. at
174-75. In another case involving a dam and dam-
induced water-quality changes, the Sixth Circuit also
concluded that the EPA's position on this question should
be deferred to if reasonable. See Consumers Power, 862
F.2d at 584. Both the Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits, in essence, gave Chevron deference to the EPA's
position that the release of water which had been polluted
by dam-related, water-quality changes and which flowed
from a dam into another body of navigable water
constituted no "discharge of pollutants." But see Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir.2001) (concluding
EPA's position in Gorsuch and Consumers Power which
was based on policy statements and consistent litigation
positions is not entitled to Chevron deference); see also
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120
S.Ct. 1655, 1662, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000)
("[I]nterpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines ... do not warrant
Chevron-style deference.").
We know of no instance in which the EPA has extended
interpretation, when a point source conveys one
navigable water into another, no addition of
pollutants will occur unless the point source
itself is the source of the pollutants which it
releases. And, because S-9 does not itself
introduce pollutants from the outside into the
water which it conveys, the Water District
contends no addition of pollutants occurs.
First, we conclude that, in determining whether
pollutants are added to navigable waters for
purposes of the CWA, the receiving body of
water is the relevant body of navigable water.
Thus, we must determine whether pollutants are
being added to WCA-3A. They are.5
Nevertheless, for an addition of a pollutants to
navigable waters to require an NPDES permit,
that addition of pollutants must be from a point
its policy on dams and dam-induced water-quality
changes to facilities like the S-9 pump station. The EPA is
no party to this case; we can ascertain no EPA position
applicable to S-9 to which to give any deference, much
less Chevron deference.
We also reject the Water District's argument that the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection's
decision, using the Gorsuch addition test, that operation
of the S-9 pump does not require an NPDES permit is
entitled to Chevron deference. A state agency's
interpretation of federal law is generally not entitled to
deference by the courts. GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison,
199 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir.1999).
We reject the Water District's argument that no addition
of pollutants can occur unless pollutants are added from
the outside world insofar as the Water District contends
the outside world cannot include another body of
navigable waters. Cf Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at
491 (construing "outside world" to include "any place
outside the particular water body to which pollutants are
introduced") (emphasis added). This conclusion is also
consistent with precedent concluding that a redeposit of
soil which has been dredged by a boat's propellers can
constitute an addition of pollutants requiring regulation by
the "dredge and fill" permitting system of the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1344. See United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc.,
772 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (11th Cir.1985), vacated on other
grounds by 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d
809 (1987), reinstated in relevant part on remand, 848
F.2d 1133 (11th Cir.1988).
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source. And, for an addition of pollutants to be
from a point source, the relevant inquiry is
whether--but for the point source--the pollutants
would have been added to the receiving body of
water.6 We, therefore, conclude that an addition
from a point source occurs if a point source is
the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants into
navigable waters.
When a point source changes the natural flow
of a body of water which contains pollutants and
causes that water to flow into another distinct
body of navigable water into which it would not
have otherwise flowed, that point source is the
cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants.7
And, because the pollutants would not have
entered the second body of water but for the
change in flow caused by the point source, an
addition of pollutants from a point source
6 As noted above, the Water District concentrates on the
fact that S-9 is not the original source of the pollutants in
the water which it conveys. For pollutants to be from a
point source, the point source does not necessarily have to
be the source or origin of pollutants. "From a point
source" can also indicate the "agent or instrumentality" or
the "cause or reason" by which the pollutants are added to
navigable waters. See The Random House Dictionary of
the English Language 770 (2d ed.1987) (defining "from").
We conclude that this interpretation of "from" is most apt:
from = by. And no dispute exists on whether pollutants,
in fact, are added to navigable waters (WCA-3A) by a
point source (S-9) here.
Our conclusion is consistent with the views of the First
and Second Circuits. In Dubois v. United States
Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir.1996),
the First Circuit concluded that the piping of water from
the polluted East Branch River for commercial use and its
proposed release into the upstream Loon Lake would
constitute an addition of pollutants from a point source.
Id. at 1296-99. Then, in Catskill Mountains, the Second
Circuit concluded that the diversion of water from a
reservoir containing pollutants by tunnel into a creek for
which the reservoir was not naturally a source would
constitute an addition of pollutants from a point source.
Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 492. Both courts
emphasized that the two bodies of water were separate
and that pollutants would not enter the second body
except for the point source.
occurs. Neither party disputes that, without the
operation of the S-9 pump station, the polluted
waters from the C-1 I Canal would not normally
flow east into the WCA-3A.8 The S-9 pump
station, therefore, is the cause-in-fact of the
addition of pollutants to the WCA-3A. We,
therefore, conclude that the release of water
caused by the S-9 pump station's operation
constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point
source.
B. The Injunction
Next, the Water District contends that the
district court abused its discretion by enjoining
the Water District from operating the S-9 pump
station without an NPDES permit. The Water
District argues that the court erred by not
applying traditional equitable standards in its
grant of the injunction. See Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320, 102 S.Ct.
1798, 1807, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (prohibition
against discharge of pollutants in CWA does not
foreclose exercise of equitable discretion).
And, according to the Water District, had the
district court balanced the potential harm caused
by enjoining the operation of S-9 against the
8 Both the C-i1 Basin and the WCA-3A were part of the
historical Everglades. Before construction of the C-l I
Canal, the Levees, and the S- 9 pump station, the surface
and ground waters on both side of the Levees
intermingled. The natural flow of the waters at that time
was a southerly moving sheet of water. But for man's
intervention, these waters would essentially be a single
body of navigable water.
Since the completion of the L-33 and L-37 levees, water
does not flow from the C-ll Canal into WCA-3A. Man
has made the two bodies of water two separate and
distinct bodies of water. The Water District argues that
the historical hydrological connectedness of these two
bodies of water (1) precludes a finding that the WCA-3A
and the C-Il Canal are two distinct bodies of water, and(2) precludes a finding that the operation of the S-9
changes the "natural" flow of water between these two
bodies. In the context of the circumstances of this case,
we reject the Water District's argument.
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harm prevented,9 the court would have
concluded that S-9 should not be enjoined from
operating without an NPDES permit.
We review for an abuse of discretion the
district court's decision to grant an injunction
under the CWA. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at
320, 102 S.Ct. at 1807. In determining whether
an injunction is proper, not only should a district
court "balance[ ] the conveniences of the parties
and possible injuries to them according as they
may be affected by the granting or withholding
of the injunction[,]" but the court "should [also]
pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary
remedy of injunction." Id. at 312, 102 S.Ct. at
1803 (citation omitted); see also Million Youth
March, Inc. v. Safir, 155 F.3d 124, 125 (2d
Cir.1998) ("An injunction is an exercise of a
court's equitable authority, and the exercise of
that authority, in the vindication of any legal
protection ... must sensitively assess all the
equities of the situation, including the public
interest."); Okaw Drainage Dist. v. Nat'l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 882 F.2d 1241, 1248
(7th Cir.1989) ("[A]n injunction ... may not be
granted without consideration of the equities,
including the costs that the injunction is likely to
impose on third parties."). Because the
cessation of the S-9 pump would cause
substantial flooding in western Broward County
which, in turn, would cause damage to and
displacement of a significant number of
people,' 0 we conclude that the people of
Broward County have a very significant interest
in whether the S-9 pump station's operation
Without the operation of S-9, the western portion of
Broward County would flood in only days.
10 Broward County is a highly populated county with a
population of 1,623,081 according to the 2000 United
States Census. See Ranking Tables for Counties:
Population in 2000 and Population Change from 1990 to
2000 (PHC-T-4) (2001), available at http://
www.census.gov/population/cen2000/ phc-t4/tab0l.pdf.
should be enjoined.
The district court's injunction prohibits the
Water District from operating S- 9 without an
NPDES permit. If this injunction were
enforced, the Water District could not continue
to operate S-9 while applying for an NPDES
permit.II And although on appeal Plaintiffs
defend the district court's injunction, Plaintiffs
have repeatedly represented that they--because
of the substantial flooding of Broward County
which would result--do not really seek the
cessation of S-9's operation. At the summary
judgment motion hearing before the district
court, Plaintiffs said these things:
We would like [the Water District] to be
enjoined from continuing [discharging
pollutants without an NPDES permit.]
Now, I don't, in any way, propose turning off
the pump. That has been discussed a couple
of times here. It's sort of a frightening option,
but I don't think that specifically is feasible.
However, if [the Water District] were ordered
to apply and take all necessary and appropriate
measures to obtain as quickly as possible the
necessary permits, to actually use the permit
in compliance with the law....
So we are not asking that you just turn off the
pump or suddenly stop every single
pollutant....
So, declare them in violation. Order them to
get out of violation, to obtain the necessary
permits, to discharge in the legal manner.
R-164 at 64-65 (emphasis added).
After the district court enjoined the operation of
In their briefs, Plaintiffs try to draw a distinction
between a hypothetical injunction which enjoins the
operation of S-9 and the actual injunction which enjoins
the operation of S-9 without an NPDES permit. Because
S-9 currently has no NPDES permit, this distinction is one
without a difference. The injunction that was entered
does mandate that S-9's operation be discontinued.
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S-9 without a permit, the Water District brought
an emergency motion for relief from the
judgment. Because of the disastrous
consequences of discontinuing S-9's operation,
Plaintiffs did not oppose this motion and agreed
that a stay of the injunction was proper.12 And,
in response to the Water District's motion for
reconsideration to the district court, Plaintiffs
stated that they would agree to whatever stays
were necessary for the Water District to obtain
an NPDES permit for S-9. Plaintiffs, thus,
appear to recognize and admit the exceedingly
serious public loss that would result from
enforcing the district court's injunction.
From the record before us, we cannot conclude
that the district court's injunction could ever be
properly enforced. Nor can we conclude that
Plaintiffs have ever really intended for that
injunction to be enforced. The flooding of
western Broward County and the resulting
displacement of the residents there do far
outweigh the continued addition of low levels of
phosphorus to WCA-3A without an NPDES
permit. No district court faced with the record
could correctly conclude otherwise.
The United States Supreme Court warns
"[t]here is no power, the exercise of which is
more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation, and sound discretion, or more
dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing
[sic] an injunction." Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 141, 142, 12 L.Ed. 88 (1847). "Once
issued, an injunction may be enforced." Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2565,
2573, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). So, we do not
want injunctions to linger in existence when
12 The district court originally granted a forty-day stay of
the issuance of the injunction for the Water District to
seek an NPDES permit for S-9. See R-125, R-136. The
parties then filed a joint motion to extend the stay of
injunctive relief pending resolution of this appeal or the
receipt of an NPDES permit. The district court granted
this joint motion. R-142 at 1-2.
they are not right. Moreover, this "strong arm
of equity," see Truly, 46 U.S. at 142, is debased
and weakened if used to issue injunctions which
cannot rightly be enforced and are actually
never intended to be enforced. "The equity
court ... must always be alert in the exercise of
its discretion to make sure that its decree will
not be a futile and ineffective thing."
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 290, 69
S.Ct. 1, 5, 93 L.Ed. 3 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Injunctions must be taken
seriously. What the courts order to be done
should be done. And what should not or cannot
be done must not be ordered to be done.
At the hearing leading up to the injunction,
some evidence and argument pointed out that
severe flooding would occur if S-9 were shut
down. But, a lot of information about other
points was also presented to the district court at
about the same time. At the later hearing on the
Water District's emergency motion for relief
from judgment, the district court stated, "I was
not aware that the injunction would have the
dire consequences of literally opening the flood
gates." R-165 at 2. It seems to us that, in the
light of the district court's wrong impression of
the consequences, the district court could not
have correctly balanced the possible harms--
especially the harm to the public--caused by the
enjoinment of S-9 against the benefits when it
granted its injunction. That the district court
agreed to stay the injunction, when the dire
consequences were brought home to the district
court, does not make the injunction any less an
abuse of discretion.
Instead of issuing an injunction which cannot
be rightly enforced, the district court should
order the Water District to obtain an NPDES
permit within some reasonable period. And, if
the Water District fails to comply with this
order, Plaintiffs may then seek to enforce the
order through the various enforcement
mechanisms available under the CWA, such as
fines and criminal penalties. See 33 U.S.C. §
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1319.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
district court's judgment that the Water District
violated the Clean Water Act, VACATE the
judgment awarding the injunction, and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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Court to study Glades pollution case
St. Petersburg Times
June 28, 2003
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court said
Friday it will consider a case involving the
endangered Florida Everglades that tests the
federal government's power to fight pollution.
Justices will consider next term how much
authority the federal government has in
controlling water pumping across the
Everglades basin.
The Bush administration urged the court last
month to reject the appeal from Florida water
managers who argued they should not be
required to get federal permits to pump polluted
suburban water into the
cleaner Everglades.
An appeals court sided with environmentalists
and the Miccosukee Indian tribe in ordering the
South Florida Water Management District to
apply for permits.
"To us the issue is: Can a government agency
take polluted water and put it into pristine water,
where it would otherwise not go except for their
manipulating it and pumping it? They say they
can as long as they don't add the pollutant," said
Dexter Lehtinen, attorney for Miccosukee
Indians pushing for the permit requirement.
Former district general counsel John Fumero
challenged that contention and said the issue is
about federal oversight and its implications for
water supply and flood control agencies.
"Florida has some of the most highly regulated
and sophisticated water management regulations
anywhere in the country," he said. "If there was
a place in the United States that doesn't need
another level of federal overreaching into the
regulatory area, it's Florida."
A cost-sharing blueprint signed last year by
President Bush and his brother, Gov. Jeb Bush,
calls for spending $7.8-billion over 30 years to
restore about 2.4-million acres of the Everglades
ecosystem.
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NO PERMIT TO POLLUTE
The Palm Beach Post
July 6, 2003
OPINION
The state agency didn't pollute the water. But it
moves polluted water from one place to another
and dumps it into clean water, such as the
Everglades. Is the agency a polluter? The South
Florida Water Management District, which
moves and dumps polluted water into cleaner
water daily, wants to know. Unhappy with
lower court rulings that hold the water district
responsible, the district appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which last week agreed to
consider the case. Responding to a suit by the
Miccosukee Indian Tribe and the environmental
group Friends of the Everglades, an appeals
court earlier said the water district must obtain a
federal permit to pump polluted water from
Broward County suburbs into the Everglades.
The district a!rgues that as long as it doesn't add
the pollutant, it should be allowed to pump
polluted water into pristine water without a
federal permit.
The Supreme Court expects to hear the case in
January. The high court's decision could set
precedents that would affect water managers
and water bodies nationwide. If the court sides
with the Miccosukees, the case also could have
implications for other Florida waters that suffer
from polluted water that the water management
district dumps. For example, the St. Lucie and
Caloosahatchee rivers routinely receive huge
quantities of polluted fresh water that the district
and the Army Corps of Engineers dump from
Lake Okeechobee. Since Florida's Department
of Environmental Protection is either unable or
unwilling to enforce clean-water standards when
a fellow state agency is the polluter, the state's
clean waters have no defense from water district
discharges of polluted water.
The water district has drawn support from 15
other groups, including the National League of
Cities, the American Farm Bureau and private
foundations, in its suit. The district argues that
federal permits apply to individual polluters
such as wastewater treatment plants, but not to a
state agency such as the district. If the court
sides with the district, it could set a precedent
allowing other government agencies the right to
dump polluted water into clean water.
Water district officials claim the district doesn't
need federal oversight interfering with the
state's right to move its waters. The district is
wasting taxpayer money by seeking a Supreme
Court ruling to let it off the hook - money that
could be better spent cleaning up polluted water.
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Supreme Court Docket Report, October Term, 2002 - Number 17.
Monday Business Briefing
July 10, 2003
Miriam Nemetz and Robert L. Bronston.
Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in three cases of potential interest to the
business community. Absent extensions,
amicus briefs in support of the petitioners
are due on Monday, August 11, 2003, and
amicus briefs in support of the respondents
are due on Monday, September 15, 2003. 1.
Clean Water Act Permit Requirement
Discharge of Pollutants. Under the Clean
Water Act, "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source" is a
"discharge of a pollutant" that requires a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit. 33 U.S.C.
1362(12). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in South Florida Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, No.
02-626, to decide whether the Clean Water
Act requires a state water manag!ement
district to obtain an NPDES permit to pump
water across a levee into the Everglades
where the pumped water contains slightly
more pollutants than the receiving water.
The South Florida Water Management
District (SFWMD) is the state agency
responsible for managing water in South
Florida, including populated Broward
County and the Everglades, to prevent
flooding, provide drinking water, and
protect the environment. SFWMD pumps
water from water-collection canals in
western Broward County across a levee into
the Everglades-an operation essential to
prevent Broward County from flooding. The
pumped water contains slightly more
phosphorous than the receiving waters. The
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends
of the Everglades, Inc., filed citizen suits
against SFWMD, alleging that the District's
pumping of polluted water across the levee
was an "addition" of pollutants to the
receiving water under the Clean Water Act
that required a permit, even though SFWMID
did not pollute the water it pumped!.
SFWMD argued for a narrower
interpretation of the terms "addition" "from
any point source" that excludes acts not
affecting the pollution levels of the pumped
water.
The district court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that
SFWMD's pumps required an NPDES
permit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South
Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364
(2002). The court of appeals found
SFWMD's pump system to be a "but for"
cause of pollution in the receiving waters,
and concluded that operating the pumps
without an NPDES permit violated the
Clean Water Act. Id. at 1369. Under the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the Act,
any pumping of water that is a "cause-in-fact
of the release of pollutants into navigable
waters" requires a permit. Id. at 1368.
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
Clean Water Act deepened a conflict among
the courts of appeals on this issue. The D.C.
and Sixth Circuits have accepted the
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position of the Environmental Protection
Agency that an "addition" "from" a point
source occurs only if the point source itself
physically introduces a pollutant into the
water from the outside world. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d
580, 581 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat'1 Wildlife
Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 179 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). The First and Second Circuits,
however, agree with the Eleventh Circuit
that pumping systems similar to the
SFWMD's could fall within the scope of the
Act. Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996); Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.
v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
2001).
The case is highly significant for private and
public entities involved in water
management and allocation, and any
business that has need to move or control
water (such as mining, farming, and
development). If the Court were to embrace
the Eleventh Circuit's broad interpretation of
the Clean Water Act, a wide range of
additional activities would require NPDES
permits, necessitating lengthy and costly
public permitting proceedings and inviting
litigation over the propriety of permit terms.
Mayer, Brown, Rowe
represents the South
Management District.
& Maw LLP
Florida Water
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02-314 Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management
District
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 309 F.3d 550)
District court's judgment that Clean Air Act does not preempt fleet rules adopted by
California's South Coast Air Quality Management District is affirmed, for reasons stated
in that court's opinion, namely that rules, which require that when certain fleet operators
purchase or replace fleet vehicles they must acquire only those specific vehicles that
SCAQMD has designated as meeting "cleaner" standards and requirements under
California Air Resources Board vehicle standards, do not impose new emission
requirements on manufacturers or otherwise set "standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines" that would be
preempted under Section 209(a) of Clean Air Act.
Question Presented: Are local government regulations prohibiting purchase of new
motor vehicles with specified emission characteristics-which are otherwise approved
for sale by state and federal regulators-preempted by Clean Air Act?
Engine Manufacturers Association, Plaintiff- Appellant,
V.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided October 24, 2002.
ORDER
Engine Manufacturers Association and
Western States Petroleum Association
appeal the district court's judgment that
the fleet rules adopted by the South
Coast Air Quality Management District
are not preempted by the Clean Air Act.
We affirm the decision of the district
court for the reasons stated in its well-
reasoned opinion, reported at Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 158 F.Supp.2d 1107
(C.D.Cal.2001). [Footnote omitted.]
AFFIRMED.
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Engine Manufacturers Association, Plaintiff,
V.
South Coast Air Quality Management District ("SCAQMD"), et al., Defendants.
United States District Court,
C.D. California
158 F.Supp.2d 1107 (C.D.Cal.2001)
Decided August 22, 2001.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COOPER, District Judge.
I. Background
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Engine Manufacturers
Association ("EMA") is the not-for-
profit trade association representing the
leading manufacturers of internal
combustion engines used in most all
medium-duty and heavy-duty motor
vehicles, other than passenger cars. ***
Plaintiff-in-Intervention Western States
Petroleum Association ("WSPA") is a
trade association organized as a
nonprofit corporation under California
law. Its members consist of companies
engaged in the exploration, production,
transportation, refining and marketing of
crude oil and petroleum products,
including diesel fuel.
Defendant South Coast Air Quality
Management District ("SCAQMD") is
the air quality management district
established under the California Health
and Safety Code to develop and
implement a strategy for achieving and
maintaining ambient air quality
standards within the South Coast Air
Basin. Agents of the SCAMQD,
including the SCAMQD Defendants, are
responsible for administering the Fleet
Rules at issue.
Defendants-in-Intervention
"Environmental Intervenors" are non-
profit organizations dedicated to the
protection of the environment and public
health.
B. The South Coast Air Basin
The South Coast Air Basin ("the
Basin"), which includes Los Angeles,
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange
Counties, experiences the most serious
air quality problems in the nation,
primarily due to motor vehicle pollution.
It is the only air basin in the country
classified by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
("E.P.A.") as an extreme nonattainment
area. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a). On-road
motor vehicles contribute more than
one-half of the ozone precursors emitted
in the Basin and are a principal source of
toxic pollution.
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Emission of particulate matter from
diesel vehicles and equipment is the
most significant individual toxic air
pollutant in the Basin, accounting for
fully seventy-one percent (71%) of the
air-borne cancer risk. The California Air
Resources Board ("CARB") has
formally designated particulate
emissions from diesel-fueled vehicles as
a Toxic Air Contaminant. Studies reveal
that exposure to diesel exhaust increases
the risk of developing lung cancer and
other non-cancer adverse health effects.
Diesel exhaust has also long been
considered a probable human carcinogen
by the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health and by the
International Agency for Research on
Cancer.
Diesel trucks and buses are also
significant contributors to smog and fine
particles, two pollutants that have
serious public health impacts. On- road
motor vehicles contribute more than half
of all smog-forming hydrocarbons and
oxides of nitrogen in the entire emissions
inventory. More than ninety-percent
(90%) of the particles emitted from
diesel engines are fine particles. Fine
particles are particularly hazardous
because they can bypass respiratory
defense mechanisms and penetrate
deeply into the lungs. The presence of
high quantities of fine particles in the air
has been shown to lead to higher
mortality rates, greater occurrences and
severity of asthma, cardiovascular
disease, and potentially to a higher
incidence of cancer.
C. Legislative Background
1. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q ("CAA"), "is one of the most
comprehensive pieces of legislation in
our nation's history." Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 524
(2d Cir.1994). The CAA makes "the
States and the Federal Government
partners in the struggle against air
pollution." General Motors Corp. v.
U.S., 496 U.S. 530, 532, (1990). A
primary purpose of the CAA is "to
encourage or otherwise promote
reasonable Federal, State, and local
governmental actions, consistent with
the provisions of this chapter, for
pollution prevention." 42 U.S.C. §
7401(c). Additionally, Congress
envisioned the CAA as a means of
encouraging and assisting "the
development and operation of regional
air pollution prevention and control
programs." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(4).
The CAA directs the E.P.A. to establish
and enforce national ambient air quality
standards ("NAAQS") for pollutants that
''cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 42
U.S.C. § 7408(a). To achieve and
maintain these NAAQS by regulating
sources of air pollution, each state is
required to submit a state
implementation plan ("SIP") to the EPA
for approval. CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. §
7410(a)(1). However, states may not
promulgate individual motor vehicle
emission standards to attain the NAAQS
set by the EPA. Section 209(a) expressly
preempts all state regulation of motor
vehicle emissions. Congress preempted
the field of vehicle emission regulation
for two reasons: "to ensure uniformity
throughout the nation, and to avoid the
undue burden on motor vehicle
manufacturers which would result from
different state standards." Motor Vehicle
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Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't. of
Envtl. Conservation, 810 F.Supp. 1331,
1337 (N.D.N.Y.1993), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994).
"Both the history and text of the
[CAA] show that the ... preemption
section was made not to hamstring
localities in their fight against air
pollution but to prevent the burden on
interstate commerce which would
result if, instead of uniform standards,
every state and locality were left free
to impose different standards for
exhaust emission control devices for
the manufacture and sale of new cars."
Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of
340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124
1972).
New York,
(S.D.N.Y.
2. Preemption
The United States Supreme Court has
given substantial weight in the
preemption analysis to evidence that
Congress intended to preserve the state
regulatory authority, stating that courts
must "give full effect to evidence that
Congress considered, and sought to
preserve, the States' coordinate
regulatory role in our federal scheme."
California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 497, (1990).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that preemption provisions
must be narrowly and strictly construed.
See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43,
(1986); see also Charas v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th
Cir.1998); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419
F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir.1969) (where
exercise of local police power serves the
purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive
effect of that Act should be narrowly
construed).
The Clean Air Act explicitly protects the
authority of states to regulate air
pollution. The first section of the CAA,
entitled "Congressional Findings", 42
U.S.C. § 7401, makes clear that the
states retain the leading authority in
regulating matters of health and air
quality: "air pollution prevention (that is,
the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants
produced or created at the source) and
air pollution control at its source is the
primary responsibility of States and local
governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 7407, which
focuses on SIPs, provides: "Each state
shall have the primary responsibility for
assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State
by submitting an implementation plan
for such State which will specify the
manner in which national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards
will be achieved and maintained within
each air quality control region in such
State." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
"In preemption analysis, the Supreme
Court is highly deferential to state law in
areas traditionally regulated by the
states." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. U.S.
E.P.A., 217 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th
Cir.2000). The Court has explained:
[Wie have never assumed lightly that
Congress has derogated state
regulation, but instead have addressed
claims of pre-emption with the starting
presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law ... [I]n
cases like this one, where federal law
is said to bar state action in fields of
traditional state regulation ... we have
worked on the 'assumption that the
historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the
370
Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.'
N.Y State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 654-55, (1995) (internal
citations omitted). "Air pollution
prevention falls under the broad police
powers of the states, which include the
power to protect the health of citizens in
the state. Environmental regulation has
traditionally been a matter of state
authority." Exxon Mobil Corp., 217 F.3d
at 1255; see also Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep't of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 894
(D.C.Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has
directed that the preemption analysis
begin with the presumption that such
local police powers are not preempted:
"Throughout our history the several
States have exercised their police powers
to protect the health and safety of their
citizens. Because these are 'primarily, ...
matter [s] of local concern,' the 'States
traditionally have had great latitude
under their police powers to legislate as
to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons."' Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 475, (1996) (internal citations
omitted). The CAA "explicitly preserved
this principle: 'Each state shall have the
primary responsibility for assuring air
quality within the entire geographic area
comprising such State."' Train v. Natural
Res. Def Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64,
(1975).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the objectives and
purpose of a statute, as well as the text,
are critical to the preemption analysis.
See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654,;
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486. "The
overriding purpose of the Clean Air Act
is to force states to do their job in
regulating air pollution effectively so as
to achieve baseline air quality standards,
the NAAQS. The primary mechanism
for achieving the NAAQS are through
the local and state planning process
which create the SIPs." Exxon Mobil
Corp., 217 F.3d at 1255-56. "As
regulating air pollution falls under the
historic police powers of the states, the
authority of the states is assumed not to
have been preempted unless it was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress
to do so." Id. at 1256; see also Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230, (1947) ("[Wle start with the
assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.").
3. Legislative History of the Clean Air
Act
The original CAA, enacted by Congress
in 1955, was aimed primarily at
increasing federal research and
assistance in air pollution prevention. It
made no provision for federal motor
vehicle emission standards. After several
states adopted their own motor vehicle
emission standards, the Senate
Committee on Public Works decided
that national standards were to be
preferred over having each state go its
own way, "which could result in chaos
insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and
users are concerned." S.Rep. No. 192,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965). As a
result, Congress enacted emission
standards for new motor vehicle engines.
Despite this enactment, a number of
states continued to develop separate
emission programs. Congress promptly
amended the CAA in 1967 to impose
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federal preemption over motor vehicle
emission standards. See Air Quality Act
of 1967, Pub.L. No. 90-148, § 208, 81
Stat. 485. An exception, however, was
made for California because of its
"unique problems" and its "pioneering
efforts" to control its particularly severe
air quality problems. Id. at § 208(b);
S.Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). In 1970, the Act was amended to
establish national ambient air quality
standards ("NAAQS"), which required
even more stringent uniform emission
standards for new motor vehicles. See
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.L.
No. 91-604, §§ 4, 6, 84 Stat. 1676.
In 1990, the Clean Air Act was amended
once again. Title I of the Act directs the
E.P.A. Administrator to develop
NAAQS for pollutants the Administrator
determines "cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
The states are vested with the primary
responsibility for attaining and
maintaining the NAAQS through the
development and implementation of a
state implementation plan ("SP"). See
CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Each
state's SIP, which is submitted to the
E.P.A., must explain exactly how the
state intends to reduce or maintain the
concentration of pollution in the air to
meet the NAAQS. "The states have
broad license to institute their own
programs for the reduction of air
pollution...." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n,
17 F.3d at 525.
Title II of the Act reflects Congress'
endeavor to resolve the problems caused
by moveable sources or vehicle
emissions. The emission standards
applicable to any given vehicle depend
upon its weight and use classification,
and its model year designation. See CAA
§§ 202, 207(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521,
7541(c). Section 202 authorizes the
E.P.A. Administrator to promulgate
emission standards for motor vehicles
sold in the United States. Motor vehicle
emission standards primarily regulate
emissions of carbon monoxide (CO),
hydrocarbons or volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides
(NO subx).
The "cornerstone of Title I is Congress'
continued express preemption of state
regulation of automobile emissions."
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 17 F.3d at
526; see CAA § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. §
7543(a); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v.
U.S. Envtil. Prot. Agency, 88 F.3d 1075,
1079 (D.C.Cir.1996). The majority of
states have chosen to rely on the federal
emission standards set forth in § 202 of
the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7521. Only
California enjoys a statutory exemption
allowing it to promulgate its own
emission standards. See CAA § 209(b),
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). California may
only adopt and enforce its own emission
standards, however, after applying to
and obtaining the approval of the E.P.A.
for a waiver of preemption. See CAA §
209(b), 42 U.S.C. 7543. The California
Air Resources Board ("CARB") submits
an application upon determining that its
proposed standards "will be, in the
aggregate, at least as protective of public
health and welfare as the applicable
Federal standards." Id. Were California
simply to change its standards, and such
change were found to be within the
scope of an existing waiver, California
need not submit a new waiver
application. Id.
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Additionally, other states could
promulgate regulations requiring
vehicles sold in their state to be in
compliance with California's emission
standards, or, in other words, to
"piggyback" onto California's
preemption exception. This opt-in
authority, set forth in CAA § 177, 42
U.S.C. § 7507, is carefully drafted to
avoid placing "an undue burden on the
automobile manufacturing industry."
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 17 F.3d at
527. Specifically: (1) an opt-in state
must adopt standards identical to
California's; (2) California must receive
a waiver from the E.P.A. for the
standards; and (3) both California and
the opt-in state must adopt the standards
at least two years before the beginning
of the automobile model year to which
they apply. See CAA § 177, 42 U.S.C. §
7507.
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA
added two further restrictions to § 177.
First, Congress added language
providing that § 177 shall not be
construed as authorizing an opt-in state
to limit the sale of California-certified
vehicles. Second, it forbade opt-in states
from taking any action that has the effect
of creating a car different from those
produced to meet either federal or
California emission standards, a so-
called "third vehicle."
4. California's Plan
Pursuant to its authority to adopt
separate emission control requirements
for new motor vehicle engines,
California, acting through CARB, has
enacted two stringent emission control
programs for motor vehicles: one for
light and medium-duty motor vehicles,
including certain diesel-fueled vehicles
(the "LEV Program"), and one for
heavy-duty urban transit buses (the
"Urban Bus Program").
a. The LEV Program
In adopting the LEV Program in 1990-
1991, CARB established the most
stringent exhaust regulations ever for
light and medium-duty vehicles. The
regulations include three primary
elements: (1) four tiers of exhaust
emission standards for increasingly
stringent categories of low-emission
vehicles; (2) a mechanism requiring
manufacturers to phase in a
progressively cleaner mix of vehicles
from year to year; and (3) a requirement
that a specified percentage of passenger
cars and lighter light-duty trucks be
zero-emission vehicles ("ZEVs").
The four tiers of exhaust emission
standards, in descending order of
emission levels are: (1)Transitional
Low-Emission Vehicles ("TLEVs"); (2)
Low-Emission Vehicles ("L Vs"); (3)
Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicles
("ULEVs"); and (4) Zero- Emission
Vehicles ("ZEVs"). For each category a
set of more stringent emission standards
for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides
and formaldehyde applies. The LEV
Program achieves emission reductions
by requiring manufacturers to sell
progressively cleaner mixes of vehicles
over time. The average emissions from
the mix of these categories of vehicles
produced by a given manufacturer in a
given year must meet an overall "fleet
average" requirement. Automobile
manufacturers, under CARB's
regulations, have the flexibility to decide
how many vehicles of each type they
manufacture and sell in order to meet the
fleet average. Additional flexibility is
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provided through the establishment of a
marketable credit system: manufacturers
may earn credits if they sell more LEVs
than needed to meet the fleet average.
b. The Urban Bus Program
On February 24, 2000, CARB adopted
its Urban Bus Program ("UBP") to
further reduce air pollution from large
urban transit buses. The UBP requires:
(i) reductions in particulate matter
("PM") and oxides of nitrogen ("NOx")
fleet emissions by urban transit bus
operators; and (ii) stringent exhaust
emission standards applicable to engine
manufacturers. To implement the CARB
regulation, urban transit bus fleet
operators are required to choose between
two different compliance paths: (i) a
diesel path or (ii) an alternative fuel
path. Fleet operators were required to
notify CARB of their choice by January
31, 2001.
Fleet operators choosing the diesel path
may continue to purchase diesel
powered buses as long as they comply
with emission standards. These emission
requirements specify that engines meet
an eighty-percent (80%) PM emission
reduction by October 2002. For the 2004
model year, CARB established an
optional NOx emission standard
representing an eighty-seven percent
(87%) emission decrease relative to the
current NOx standard. For the 2007
model year, diesel transit bus engines
must comply with a NOx emission
standard that would result in a ninety-
five percent (95%) emission decreases
relative to the current NOx standard.
Transit agencies on the diesel path with
more than 200 urban buses in their
active fleet (on January 31, 2001) must
place into service at least three zero-
emission buses ("ZEBs") by July 1,
2003, and operate them for a year as a
required demonstration project. From
model year 2008 through model year
2015, a minimum fifteen percent (15%)
of all new bus purchases or leases must
be ZEBs for the transit agencies on the
diesel path. ZEBs must be certified by
CARB and are expected to be powered
by fuel cells, electricity, or other fuels
that result in zero-emission exhaust
levels.
The Alternative-Fuel Path requires at
least eighty-five percent (85%) of new
bus purchases to be alternative-fueled.
Alternative fuels are defined as
compressed natural gas, liquefied natural
gas, liquefied petroleum gas, methanol,
electricity, fuel cells, or other advanced
technologies that do not rely on diesel
fuel. Transit operators would need to
introduce ZEBs into their fleets by 2010.
Additionally, retrofit requirements to
reduce PM emissions from existing
buses are required under both paths.
D. The Fleet Rules
In response to the need for the South
Coast Basin to reduce pollution levels
dramatically to achieve its NAAQS, the
California state legislature in 1987
adopted Health and Safety Code §
40447.5, which authorizes the
SCAQMD to adopt fleet rules in an
effort to reduce public exposure to motor
vehicle pollution. On June 16, 2000,
August 18, 2000, and October 20, 2000,
the SCAQMD adopted six rules
(referred to hereinafter as the "Fleet
Rules"), each of which mandates that
when certain local operators of fleets
purchase or replace their fleet vehicles,
they must acquire only those specific
motor vehicles that the SCAQMD has
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designated as meeting its standards and
requirements.
1. Fleet Rule 1191
Rule 1191 requires passenger car, light-
duty truck, or medium-duty vehicle
public fleet operators to acquire low-
emitting gasoline or alternative-fueled
vehicles when procuring or leasing these
vehicles in the District. The Rule applies
to all government agencies and any
special districts with 15 or more on-road
light and medium-duty vehicles. Rule
1191 also contains specified exemptions.
(Rule 1191(f))
2. Fleet Rule 1192
Rule 1192 requires public transit fleet
operators to acquire alternative-fuel
heavy-duty vehicles when procuring or
leasing vehicles to reduce air toxic and
criteria pollutant emissions. This Rule
applies to public transit fleets with 15 or
more public transit vehicle or urban
buses, operated by government agencies
or operated by private entities under
contract to government agencies, that
provide passenger transportation
services. The Rule requires these fleet
operators to acquire alternative-fuel
vehicles when adding or replacing
vehicles. Rule 1192 also contains
specified exemptions. (Rule 1192(e))
3. Fleet Rule 1193
Rule 1193 requires public and private
solid waste collection fleet operators to
acquire alternative-fuel refuse collection
heavy-duty vehicles when procuring or
leasing these vehicles. The Rule applies
to government agencies and private
entities that operate solid waste
collection fleets with 15 or more solid
waste collection vehicles. Acquisition of
dual-fueled vehicles is allowed for fleets
of 15 or more transfer or rolloff vehicles.
Rule 1193 also contains specified
exemptions. (Rule 1193(e))
4. Fleet Rule 1194
Rule 1194 applies to public and private
fleet operators of 15 or more vehicles
that transport passengers from
commercial airports located in the
District. The affected vehicles include
taxis, shuttles, and limousines. The Rule
requires passenger car, light-duty truck,
medium-duty transit vehicle, and heavy-
duty transit vehicle fleet operators to
acquire cleaner burning or alternative-
fueled vehicles when procuring or
leasing these vehicles in the District,
unless otherwise exempt. Fleet operators
using passenger cars or medium-duty
vehicles to provide airport transportation
services must purchase a specified
percentage of vehicles that meet CARB's
standards for ultra low emission
vehicles. Fleet operators that use heavy-
duty vehicles must purchase alternative-
fuel vehicles. Specified exemptions are
provided for under this Rule as well.
(Rule 1194(e))
5. Fleet Rule 1186.1
Rule 1186.1 requires certain public and
private sweeper fleet operators to
acquire alternative-fuel or otherwise
less-polluting sweepers when purchasing
or leasing these vehicles for sweeping
operations undertaken by or for
governments or governmental agencies
in the District's jurisdiction. Rule 1186.1
also requires government agencies that
contract for sweeping services to solicit
bids or contract for services that use
alternative-fuel sweepers. An
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"alternative-fuel sweeper" is one with
"engine(s) that use compressed or
liquefied natural gas, liquefied
petroleum gas (propane), methanol,
electricity, or fuel cells. Hybrid-electric
and dual-fuel technologies that use
diesel fuel are not considered
alternative-fuel technologies for the
purposes of this rule.' (Rule
1186.1(c)(2)) Specified exemptions are
also provided for. (Rule 1186.1(f))
6. Fleet Rule 1196
Rule 1196 requires public fleet operators
of heavy-duty vehicles to acquire
alternative-fuel heavy-duty vehicles
when procuring or leasing these
vehicles. The Rule applies to all
government agencies located in the
District and to any special districts such
as water, air, sanitation, transit, and
school districts, with 15 or more heavy-
duty vehicles. These operators must
acquire alternative-fuel vehicles, dual-
fuel vehicles, or dedicated gasoline
vehicles when adding or replacing
heavy-duty vehicles. Specified
exemptions are provided for under the
Rule as well. (Rule 1196(f))
E. Procedural History
On November 21, 2000, Plaintiff EMA
filed its First Amended Complaint
against the SCAQMD Defendants for
declaratory and injunctive relief,
challenging the constitutionality of the
Fleet Rules. Specifically, Plaintiff EMA
claims the Fleet Rules violate Sections
209 and 177 of the federal Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543 and 7507, as
well as the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. Const.
Art. VI, cl. 2, and are therefore
preempted as a matter of law. On
January 17, 2001, Plaintiff-in-
Intervention WSPA also brought suit
against the SCAQMD Defendants and
the Environmental Intervenors for
declaratory and injunctive relief,
claiming the Fleet Rules violate CAA §§
209 and 177 and the Supremacy Clause.1
On March 23, 2001, Plaintiffs and
Defendants filed cross motions for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for
summary judgement on counts one (1)
through six (6) of their respective
Complaints. On April 20, 2001
California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer submitted an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the State of California
in support of Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment and in opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary
Judgment.
The parties have stipulated that this case
should be adjudicated on the pleadings,
as no material factual disputes are at
issue. The case turns entirely on the
scope of the express preemption
provisions of §§ 209 and 177 of the
Clean Air Act. After considering the
parties' written and oral arguments, the
Court issues the following decision:
II. Discussion
A. CAA § 209(a)
Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act
provides:
No State or any political subdivision
thereof shall adopt or attempt to
Plaintiff EMA and Plaintiff-in-Intervention
WSPA will hereinafter collectively be referred to
as "Plaintiffs." The SCAQMD Defendants and
Defendants- in-Intervention Environmental
Intervenors will hereinafter collectively be
referred to as "Defendants."
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enforce any standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
subject to this part. No State shall
require certification, inspection, or any
other approval relating to the control
of emissions from any new motor
vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as
condition precedent to the initial retail
sale, titling (if any), or registration of
such motor vehicle, motor vehicle
engine, or equipment. 42 U.S.C. §
7543(a).
Plaintiffs argue that the Fleet Rules
violate CAA § 209(a) because they
constitute "standard[s] relating to the
control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."
Plaintiffs also assert that the Fleet Rules
establish unlawful conditions precedent
to the sale of new motor vehicles or
engines.
The Court does not accept Plaintiffs'
interpretation of the impact of the Fleet
Rules. The Rules regulate the purchasing
and leasing, not the sale, of vehicles by
fleet operators. Fleet operators are
required to purchase "cleaner" vehicles
when adding or replacing fleet vehicles.
The Fleet Rules accept as given the
existing CARB vehicle standards; they
merely require fleet operators to choose
from among the least polluting of
CARB-certified, available vehicles. The
Rules impose no new emission
requirements on manufacturers
whatsoever, and therefore do not run
afoul of Congress's purpose behind
motor vehicle preemption: namely, the
protection of manufacturers against
having to build engines in compliance
with a multiplicity of standards. See
People of State of Cal. ex rel. State Air
Resources Bd. v. Department of Navy,
431 F.Supp. 1271, 1285 (N.D.Cal.1977),
affd by 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.1980)
("The reasons given for the enactment of
the pre-emption provision can be
summarized as follows: to protect the
manufacturer against having to build
engines which would comply with a
multiplicity of standards; to protect the
vehicle owner from having to deal with
different standards in each state in which
he drives; to avoid the unnecessary
duplication of federal standards; to avoid
'unnecessary expense' to the owner; and
generally to avoid 'chaos' and
'confusion"'. (internal citations omitted)).
Furthermore, the Fleet Rules do not set a
"standard relating to the control of
emissions." Rather than imposing any
numerical control on new vehicles, the
rules regulate the purchase of
previously-certified vehicles. Plaintiffs
rely primarily on two cases to support
their contention that the Fleet Rules
constitute unlawful standards: Am. Auto.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d
Cir. 1998) and Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir.2000). These cases hold that an
attempt to limit the sale of vehicles is
preempted. In Cahill and Commissioner,
the states of New York and
Massachusetts, respectively, adopted
California's emission standards targeting
ZEVs. Under the California regulations,
two percent (2%) of all new vehicles
certified for sale in California for model
years 1998-2000, five percent (5%) for
model years 2001-2002, and ten percent
(10%) for model year 2003 were
required to be ZEVs. California's
program was granted a § 209(b) waiver
by the E.P.A. in 1993, and New York
and Massachusetts adopted the program
pursuant to CAA § 177. Both the Second
Circuit in Cahill and the First Circuit in
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Commissioner held that "the ZEV sales
requirement imust be considered a
standard 'relating to the control of
emissions."' Cahill, 152 F.3d at 200;
Commissioner, 208 F.3d at 6. The ZEV
program mandated that a specified
percentage of cars sold by manufacturers
in any model year be ZEVs. "The ZEV
sales requirement is, therefore, in the
nature of a command having a direct
effect on the level of emissions, rather
than in the nature of a means of
enforcing, or testing the effectiveness of,
a command." Cahill, 152 F.3d at 200.
It does not follow, however, that a rule
regulating the purchase of vehicles is
such a standard. The Fleet Rules require
purchasers to choose from among a
subset of previously certified California
vehicles. Where a state regulation does
not compel manufacturers to meet a new
emissions limit, but rather affects the
purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules
do, that regulation is not a standard. No
restriction on the sale of vehicles is
present here. Plaintiffs may continue to
sell any vehicle which is otherwise
certified in California.
Furthermore, CAA § 246, 42 U.S.C. §
7586, expressly recognizes that Fleet
Rules must be established in areas with
particularly high pollution levels, and
authorizes restrictions on the purchase of
fleet vehicles to meet clean-air
standards. Specifically, section 246
requires that "[e]ach state in which there
is located all or part of a covered area...
shall submit.. .a State implementation
plan revision.. .to establish a clean-fuel
vehicle program for fleets under this
section." 42 U.S.C. § 7586(a)(1). Section
246 also mandates that "a specified
percentage of all new covered fleet
vehicles.. .purchased by each covered
fleet operator in each covered area shall
be clean- fuel vehicles and shall use
clean alternative fuels...." 42 U.S.C. §
7586(b). It is not rational to conclude
that the CAA would authorize
purchasing restrictions on the one hand,
and prohibit them, as a prohibited
adoption of a "standard," on the other.
Additionally, through its Health and
Safety Code, California has mandated
these Rules be enacted by Districts with
severe air quality problems. The South
Coast Air Basin is the only "extreme"
nonattainment area for ozone in the
country. It is classified as a "severe"
nonattainment area for particulate matter
and has extremely high levels of toxic
air pollution throughout the region. The
California legislature enacted Health and
Safety Code § 40447.5 in response to the
need for the South Coast Air Basin to
reduce pollution. Section 40447.5
authorizes the District to "[riequire
operators of public and commercial fleet
vehicles.. .in the south coast district,
when adding vehicles to or replacing
vehicles in an existing fleet or
purchasing vehicles to form a new fleet,
to purchase vehicles which are capable
of operating on methanol or other
equivalently clean burning alternative
fuel and to require that these vehicles be
operated, to the maximum extent
feasible, on the alternative fuel when
operating in the south coast district."
Such state regulations are presumed to
be valid. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, (1996) (stating
that the preemption analysis begins with
the presumption that local police powers,
such as air pollution prevention, are not
preempted: "Throughout our history the
several states have exercised their police
powers to protect the health and safety
of their citizens. Because these are
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'primarily, and historically, ...matter[s]
of local concern,' the 'States traditionally
have had great latitude under their police
powers to legislate as to the protection of
the.. .health... of all persons."') (internal
citations omitted) (cited in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217
F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir.2000)).
The Court therefore concludes that the
Fleet Rules do not constitute unlawful
standards "relating to the control of
emissions."
indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a
new motor vehicle or motor vehicle
engine that is certified in California as
meeting California standards, or to
take any action of any kind to create,
or have the effect of creating, a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle engine
different than a motor vehicle or
engine certified in California under
California standards (a "third vehicle")
or otherwise create such a "third
vehicle".
42 U.S.C. § 7507.
B. Section 177
Plaintiffs argue that the Fleet Rules
violate CAA § 177, which provides:
Notwithstanding section 7543(a) of
this title, any State which has plan
provisions approved under this part
may adopt and enforce for any model
year standards relating to control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines and take
such other actions as are referred to in
section 7543(a) of this title respecting
such vehicles if-
(1) such standards are identical to the
California standards for which a
waiver has been granted for such
model year, and
(2) California and such State adopt
such standards at least two years
before commencement of such model
year (as determined by regulations of
the Administrator).
Nothing in this section or in
subchapter II of this chapter shall be
construed as authorizing any such
State to prohibit or limit, directly or
As discussed earlier, CAA § 177 permits
states other than California to
"piggyback" onto California's standards
if the state's standards are identical to
California standards for which a waiver
has been granted for a model year.
Section 177, however, applies only to
non-California "opt-in" states. The
statutory language supports this
conclusion. After first referring to states
that adopt the California standards,
section 177 declares that "any such
state" is subject to certain limitations.
The word "such" indicates that the
statute is referring back to the non-
California "opt-in" states. Section 177
has no application to the right of the
District to regulate the purchase of fleet
vehicles.
Furthermore, Congress' purpose in
enacting § 177 is to prevent states from
adopting and enforcing standards in a
manner that would create a "third
vehicle." See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n,
17 F.3d at 528. Evident in the statutory
scheme is Congress' desire not to burden
manufacturers with "myriad state
emission regulations." Id. at 531.
Congress restricted states to duplicating
either federal or California standards in
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order "to protect motor vehicle
manufacturers from the undue burden of
complying with more than two different
regulatory schemes." Am. Auto. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Comm'r, 998 F.Supp. 10, 13
(D.Mass.1997) (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n, 810 F.Supp. at 1339).
[Section 177] prevents opt-in states
from imposing different emission
requirements on new vehicles and
engines that would place an undue
burden on manufacturers by requiring
them to produce materially different
new vehicles for sale in such areas. To
the extent that a manufacturer could
demonstrate that each vehicle leaving
the assembly line performs at levels to
which it was certified, that
manufacturers could claim 'undue
burden' if a state that adopted the
California standard applied
enforcement procedures that would
require materials [sic] changes in the
manufacture of such vehicles, i.e.,
production of a third car.
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Serial No. 103-38, Vol. 1 at 1022.
Therefore, "there can only be two types
of cars in this country: 'California' cars
or 'federal' cars. States cannot adopt any
other standards which would require
automakers to create a 'third' car."
Commissioner, 998 F.Supp. at 13.
The Fleet Rules impose no such "third
car" requirement. Rather, they require
purchasers to choose from among a
subset of previously certified vehicles.
Automobile manufacturers will not be
forced to do something more than they
already must do. Restricting purchases to
the types of engines already approved in
California and for which a waiver has
been granted will not violate § 177's
"third vehicle" prohibition. Section 177
bans any requirement for a third vehicle,
not all requirements intended to reduce
motor vehicle emissions. The CAA and
its legislative history show that Congress
limited the burden upon manufacturers
to that of designing and manufacturing
two versions of each motor vehicle, and
no more. The Fleet Rules may lead to
decreased demand for some cars and
trucks certified for sale in California, but
the Rules do not require the
manufacturers to build or sell any
particular model for this area. The Court
concludes, therefore, that even if § 177
were to apply, the Fleet Rules do not run
afoul of Congress' purpose in enacting §
177.
IH. Conclusion
The Court concludes that the Fleet Rules
are not preempted by § 209(a) of the
Clean Air Act and are a valid exercise of
the SCAQMD's authority. Section 177
does not apply to the District's Fleet
Rules. Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary
Judgment as to counts one through six of
their Complaints are denied. Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment are
granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Clean-Air Challenge to Get Day in Court;
Industry is fighting a push in the Los Angeles area for cleaner-burning buses, other
vehicles.
Los Angeles Times
June 10, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- A drive in the Los
Angeles area to replace old diesel-
burning buses, trash trucks, street
sweepers and airport shuttles with
cleaner-burning vehicles will be tested
this fall in the Supreme Court. The
justices agreed Monday to hear an
industry challenge to the "fleet rules"
adopted three years ago by the South
Coast Air Quality Management District.
The Engine Manufacturers Assn. and the
Western States Petroleum Assn. contend
that the federal Clean Air Act bars local
regulators from setting their own
standards for engines.
The 1970 law "expressly preempts any
state or local standards for emissions,"
said Chicago lawyer Phil Neal, who
represents the engine makers.
Environmental advocates in Los Angeles
say they are not forcing manufacturers to
change their engines, but simply asking
municipal officials to buy the cleanest-
burning buses and trucks available.
"This case is about the self-interest of
dirty-engine manufacturers," said Gail
Ruderman Feuer, a lawyer for the
Natural Resources Defense Council.
"We are fully confident the [U.S.] 9th
Circuit's decision [approving the air
quality district's rules] will be upheld by
the Supreme Court," she said.
The rules, adopted by the air quality
district in 2000, do not govern private
trucks. They regulate the purchase of a
fleet of 15 or more vehicles by cities,
county agencies, school districts and
other government units in Los Angeles,
Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino
counties.
District regulators said they were
spurred to act by a study which
concluded that diesel exhaust was
responsible for 71% of the risk of cancer
from airborne materials in the Los
Angeles area.
The rules require government managers
to purchase, when possible, buses or
trucks that use clean-burning alternative
fuels, such as natural gas.
Officials have estimated that it would
take four to 10 years for the agency
fleets to turn over as diesel trucks and
buses are replaced by newer vehicles.
The higher cost would fall on the local
agencies, and although none of them
sued, the makers of truck and bus
engines sued to block the rules from
taking effect.
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However, U.S. District Judge Florence-
Marie Cooper said the rules for new
purchases do not conflict with the Clean
Air Act.
"The fleet rules require purchasers to
choose from among a subset of
previously certified California vehicles,"
she said. This "does not compel
manufacturers to meet a new emissions
limit," she concluded.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed her ruling in a two-sentence
decision.
Meanwhile, American Trucking Assns.
and the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers joined the original
challengers in urging the high court to
intervene.
In defense of the rules, lawyers for the
air quality district said they are acting to
further "the core purpose of the Clean
Air Act, which is to reduce air
pollution."
But after considering the appeal for
several weeks, the high court issued a
one-line order Monday saying the
justices have agreed to hear the case,
Engine Manufacturers Assn. vs. the
South Coast Air Quality Management
District.
Oral arguments are set for the fall.
Copyright @ 2003 The Los Angeles
Times
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High legal horsepower: U.S. Supreme Court to rule on SCAQMD diesel rules;
engine builders, CARB, EPA settle lawsuit issues
Diesel Progress North American Edition
July 1, 2003
Mike Osenga
While June usually hails the beginning
of summer, this year it also turned out to
be a landmark period in terms of some of
the hottest legal issues involving diesel
engines. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced that it would hear a case
involving a California ban on the
purchase of diesel-powered vehicles. On
the heels of that announcement came the
news that the Engine Manufacturers
Association (EMA), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) mutually agreed to settle
several outstanding lawsuits brought by
EMA and certain members involving
specific emissions standards included in
recent EPA and CARB emissions
regulations for heavy-duty diesel
engines.
The high court agreed to hear Engine
Manufacturers Association vs. South
Coast Air Quality Management District,
02-1343, a case that will decide whether
federal clean air laws preempt California
or other state regulations that prohibit
the purchase of new diesel--fueled
vehicles. The court will hear arguments
in the case and issue its ruling in its next
term, which begins in October.
The history that led up to this decision
starts in 2000 when California's South
Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) adopted rules that prohibit
operators of fleets of 15 or more vehicles
from purchasing new diesel-f fueled
vehicles. The rules apply to Los
Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and
Orange counties.
The SCAQMD rules apply to various
operators of public and private fleets of
motor vehicles, including transit buses,
airport shuttles, limousines, taxis, street
sweepers and waste haulers. The rules
would require fleet operators to buy only
vehicles using low-emission gasoline or
an alternative fuel.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco up-held the SCAQMD
rules last year, saying there was no
preemption because the SCAQMD rules
did not impose emission standards. The
court said cars are the main cause of the
(air pollution) problem, and diesel
emission "is the most significant
individual toxic air pollutant."
The EMA and the Western States
Petroleum Association challenged the
rules, arguing they were preempted by a
section of the federal clean air law that
bars any local standard for the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles.
The two trade groups appealed to the
high court, saying the case involved an
issue of "national importance." Backing
them were the Alliance of Automobile
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Manufacturers, the Truck Manufacturers
Association and the American Trucking
Association. Automobile manufacturers
filed a friend of the court brief opposing
the rules and noting that Los Angeles
buyers cannot purchase some vehicles
that are legal for sale elsewhere in
California.
"The 9th Circuit's decision allows local
governments to impose varying and
conflicting emissions standards on the
purchase of new vehicles, balkanizing
emissions standards across the country,
undermining the regulatory authority of
the Environmental Protection Agency
and thus negating plainly stated
congressional intent," the EMA argued
[when] asking the high court to hear the
case.
While that issue is yet to be adjudicated,
the EMA called its agreement to settle
several lawsuits with EPA and CARB
"important and ground-breaking." As a
part of the lengthy negotiations that led
to the move, EPA and CARB agreed to
clarify its emissions requirements and
issue guidance documents related to the
so-called Not-To-Exceed
emissions limits that were the
manufacturers' concern.
(NTE)
subject of
As part of the agreement, engine
manufacturers volunteered to develop
and implement a manufacturer-run
program to test emissions from heavy-
duty vehicles operating on the road. This
"in-use" testing program is intended to
provide valuable information on how
new technology and controls are
working to reduce emissions under real
world conditions. The program also will
encourage the development of advanced
portable emissions testing equipment
that will make it easier to confirm that
in-use vehicles continue to comply with
all applicable emission standards
throughout their useful lives. EPA will
now develop regulations to enforce the
new in-use testing program, which will
initially be implemented in model year
2005.
Copyright © 2003 Gale Group Inc. All
rights reserved. COPYRIGHT @ 2003
Diesel & Gas Turbine Publications
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02-1290 United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (U.S.A.) Ltd.
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 302 F.3d 985, 71 U.S.L.W. 1183)
Postal Service can be sued under federal antitrust laws because Congress has stripped it
of its sovereign status by launching it into commercial world as sue-and-be-sued entity
akin to private corporation.
Question Presented: Is U.S. Postal Service "person" amenable to suit under antitrust
laws?
Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., Plaintiff-Appellants,
V.
United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 13, 2002.
[Excerpt;
omitted.]
some footnotes and citations
DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Flamingo Industries and its
owner Arthur Wah (collectively
"Flamingo") brought suit in the Northern
District of California against the United
States Postal Service. Flamingo asserted
a number of federal and state law claims
stemming from the Postal Service's
termination of Flamingo's contract to
produce U.S. Mail sacks. The district
court dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue, and did
not reach the merits of any of the claims.
Flamingo appeals.
According to the allegations of
Flamingo's complaint, which we take as
true for purposes of this appeal, the
Postal Service terminated Flamingo's
contract because it wanted to use
cheaper mail sacks manufactured in
Mexico, sacks that fail to meet safety
and quality regulations. To disguise this
scheme, the Postal Service adopted
outdated requirements for mail sacks
that could not be met by the modem
machines used by Flamingo and other
domestic manufactures, creating a
pretext for canceling the domestic mail
sack contracts. Once those contracts
were canceled, the Service declared a
fake emergency in the supply of mail
sacks that allowed it to award future
contracts to foreign manufactures on a
no-bid basis. The Service sought to hide
the false nature of this emergency by
failing to follow regulations requiring
documentation of any emergency.
Based on this alleged conduct, Flamingo
asserted five federal antitrust claims,
alleging that the Postal Service, in
collusion with Mexican mail sack
manufacturers, sought to suppress
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competition and create a monopoly in
mail sack production in violation of
federal antitrust laws. Flamingo also
asserted claims alleging that the Postal
Service violated the Postal Service
Procurement Manual, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
California Business and Professions
Code § 17200, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court did not reach the
merits of any of these claims. It
dismissed the federal antitrust claims on
the ground that the Postal Service was
protected by sovereign immunity from
antitrust liability. It determined that the
claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was a tort
claim, and dismissed it for lack of
exhaustion under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The court dismissed the
remaining claims on the ground that
venue did not lie in the Northern District
of California.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for further proceedings. We
conclude that: (1) Flamingo may pursue
claims against the Postal Service for
alleged violations of federal antitrust
laws because Congress has withdrawn
the cloak of sovereign immunity from
the Postal Service and given it the status
of a private corporation; (2) the district
court had jurisdiction over Flamingo's
Procurement Manual claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1491(b); (3) the court
properly dismissed Flamingo's breach of
implied covenant claim for failure to
exhaust under the Federal Tort Claims
Act; (4) although the district court had
original jurisdiction over Flamingo's
claim asserted under California Business
& Professions Code § 17200, that claim
was properly dismissed because it is
preempted by federal law; (5)
Flamingo's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; and (6) venue for the Postal
Service Procurement Manual claim was
properly laid in the Northern District of
California.
I
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
CLAIMS
B
Having determined that Congress has
waived the Postal Service's immunity,
we turn to the second inquiry, "whether
the source of substantive law upon
which the claimant relies provides an
avenue for relief." Meyer, 510 U.S. at
484. The source of substantive law upon
which Flamingo relies is federal antitrust
law. The Postal Service argues that a
federal antitrust claim may not be
pursued against it because it is not a
"person" within the meaning of that law.
We disagree. Although a federal
sovereign is not a "person," the Postal
Service is not a sovereign.
The rule that the federal government and
its instrumentalities are not "persons" for
federal antitrust law purposes dates back
to United States v. Cooper Corp., 312
U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071
(1941). In Cooper, the federal
government attempted to bring a civil
suit under the Sherman Act. The Court
rejected the suit, holding that the
Sherman Act only allowed "persons" to
bring civil suits and the United States
did not meet the definition of a "person"
under the Act. Id. at 604, 614. The Court
explained that, "in common usage, the
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term 'person' does not include the
sovereign, [and] statutes employing the
phrase are ordinarily construed to
exclude it." Id. at 604. Although "there is
no hard and fast rule of exclusion" of the
sovereign from the word "person," id. at
604-05, the Court was concerned
because the Sherman Act used the word
"person" to describe both who could
bring suit and who could be sued. The
Court wanted to avoid interpreting
"person" in a manner in which the
United States could be sued. Id. at 606.
Hence, the Court reasoned that "[tihe
more natural inference ... is that the
meaning of the word was in both uses
limited to what are usually known as
natural and artificial persons, that is,
individuals and corporations." Id.
Later circuit court decisions extended
Cooper to exclude federal
instrumentalities from the meaning of
the word "person" in federal antitrust
laws. In the seminal case of Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, 659
F.2d 243, 244 (D.C.Cir.1981), then-
Judge Ginsburg wrote for the court in
holding that "Congress did not place the
United States or its instrumentalities
under the governance of the Sherman
Act." The Sea-Land Service opinion
relied on Cooper, and on Congress's
decision after Cooper to amend some of
the federal antitrust laws to allow the
United States to bring civil actions for
single, but not treble, damages. Id. at
245-46. This, the court reasoned,
represented a Congressional intent to
leave the word "persons" as the Cooper
Court had defined it. Id. at 246.
In Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers,
Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th
Cir.1985), we applied Sea-Land Service
and held that federal instrumentalities
are immune from antitrust liability.
Because the defendant government of
Guam was "an instrumentality of the
federal government," we held "[t]here is
no reason why Guam should enjoy less
immunity than the federal government
itself." Id. at 1289 (citing Jet Courier
Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, 713 F.2d 1221, 1228 (6th
Cir.1983), and Sea-Land Serv., 659 F.2d
at 246-47).
Cooper, Sea-Land Service, and
Sakamoto remain valid precedent, but
they do not control our decision today.
These holdings require (or assume) that
the federal instrumentality at issue
enjoys federal sovereignty. As the
Second Circuit recently explained:
"[W]hile the Sea-Land court's holding
that the Sherman Act does not expose
federal agencies to legal or equitable
liability for alleged antitrust violations ...
is uncontroversial, such immunity was
founded on the sovereign immunity of
the United States." Name.Space, Inc. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573,
580-81 (2d Cir.2000) (citation omitted).
Here, the Postal Service does not enjoy
federal sovereignty.
The Postal Service's sue-and-be-sued
waiver of immunity has created a
presumption that the cloak of
sovereignty has been withdrawn and that
the Postal Service should be treated as a
private corporation. See Franchise Tax
Board, 467 U.S. at 520 ("[W]e must
presume that the Service's liability is the
same as that of any other business.");
accord Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 556
("Congress has cast off the Service's
'cloak of sovereignty' and given it the
'status of a private commercial
enterprise.' ") (quoting Shaw, 478 U.S. at
317 n. 5.); see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at
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482 (the Court has "looked to the
liability of a private enterprise as a floor
below which the [sue-and-be- sued]
agency's liability could not fall.").
Because the Postal Service is an entity
with the status of a private commercial
enterprise, it fits within the common
meaning of the word "person," just as
does any other private corporation. See
15 U.S.C. § 7 ("The word 'person,' or
'persons,' wherever used in [Title 15 of
the United States Code] shall be deemed
to include corporations ...."); see also Vt.
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 782, 120
S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000)
("[T]he presumption with regard to
corporations is just the opposite of the
one governing [sovereigns]: they are
presumptively covered by the term
'person' ....") (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1)
(emphasis omitted).
We find support for our conclusion in
Global Mail Ltd. v. United States Postal
Service, 142 F.3d 208, 216-17 (4th
Cir. 1998). There, the Fourth Circuit held
that the Postal Service was a "person"
that could be sued under the Lanham
Act. The court explained:
[T]he Lanham Act itself contains no
waiver of sovereign immunity for the
federal government, and ... the Act's
definition of 'person' as an
'organization capable of being sued'
falls short of the standard of
explicitness required for such a waiver.
But those agencies whose immunity
has already been waived, and are
capable of suing and being sued, fall
squarely within the plain language of
the Lanham Act's definition of 'juristic
persons.' ... [A] governmental agency
engaged in a commercial enterprise, as
is USPS, is indistinguishable in kind
from a private 'firm' or 'association.'
Id. at 216; accord Fed. Express Corp. v.
United States Postal Serv., 151 F.3d 536,
544-46 (6th Cir.1998); United States v.
Q Int'l Courier, Inc., 131 F.3d 770, 775
(8th Cir.1997). This reasoning applies
equally here, where federal antitrust law
defines "person" as including any private
corporation, see 15 U.S.C. § 7, and
where Supreme Court precedent
establishes that the Postal Service is to
be treated as a private corporation. See
Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 556.
The Postal Service cites several cases
involving sue-and-be-sued
instrumentalities where such entities
were held exempt from federal antitrust
laws. See Jet Courier Servs., 713 F.2d at
1228-29; E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v.
Mass. Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 56 (1st
Cir. 1966); Webster County Coal Corp. v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 476 F.Supp. 529,
531-32 (W.D.Ky.1979). These cases
predate the Supreme Court's decisions in
Franchise Tax Board, Loeffler, and
Meyer and are not persuasive authority
in light of the Court's recent sue-and-be-
sued jurisprudence.
We hold that the Postal Service can be
sued under federal antitrust laws because
Congress has stripped the Postal Service
of its sovereign status by launching it
into the commercial world as a sue-and-
be-sued entity akin to a private
corporation. However, we add one
significant caveat. Two types of
immunity from federal antitrust laws
exist. Our discussion has focused solely
on the first kind of immunity-"status-
based" immunity, see Name.Space, 202
F.3d at 581-because the parties only
raise that type of immunity. A second
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type of immunity-"conduct-based"
immunity-can apply when an entity
does not enjoy status-based immunity,
but acts at the direction of a federal
sovereign. See id. at 581-82 (holding that
a nonsovereign contractor enjoyed
immunity from antitrust law where it
was exercising a Congressionally-
mandated monopoly). Accordingly, our
holding that the Postal Service does not
enjoy status-based immunity does not
prevent the Service from asserting
conduct-based immunity if the action of
the Postal Service being challenged was
taken at the command of Congress. See
generally Air Courier Conf v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517,
519, 111 S.Ct. 913, 112 L.Ed.2d 1125
(1991) (recognizing that Congress has
conferred a legal monopoly on the Postal
Service over mail delivery in and from
the United States).
VII
CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's dismissal
of Flamingo's antitrust claims ***
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in
part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Justices to Decide Postal Service Antitrust Case
The Wall Street Journal
May 28, 2003
Robert S. Greenberger
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court
said it will decide whether the U.S.
Postal Service can be sued under
antitrust laws.
Allowing antitrust suits against the
Postal Service could unleash long and
costly litigation against the nation's mail
service. In a filing with the court, the
Bush administration warned of
expensive litigation that "could
undermine the ability of the Postal
Service to carry out its legislative
mandate to provide universal mail
service at reasonable rates."
The case involves Flamingo Industries
(USA) Ltd., an Illinois-based maker of
mail sacks, which sued the Postal
Service, asserting under five antitrust
claims that the Postal Service was trying
to stamp out competition in mail-sack
production by shifting its purchases to a
less-expensive manufacturer in Mexico.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed the
antitrust claims, saying that Congress
didn't intend to impose antitrust liability
on the quasigovernmental Postal
Service. But the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco,
delivered a different ruling. The appeals
court said that for legal purposes the
Postal Service is a "person" subject to
such suits. No trial has yet taken place
on the charges.
A Postal Service spokesman said,
"Clearly we do not feel that antitrust
laws do apply to us. . . . In the past, we
haven't fallen under any antitrust laws."
Filing an appeal on behalf of the Postal
Service, which has had limited ties to the
government since 1970, the U.S.
Solicitor General said the Postal Service
has "manifestly governmental character"
and that allowing it to be sued under
antitrust laws could hurt the nation's
mail service.
The Postal Service has thousands of
contracts for everything from mail sacks
to collection boxes and trucking delivery
between facilities. The spokesman
declined to comment on the potential
impact a ruling against the Postal
Service could have on its ability to
arrange contracts or control expenses.
"As a rule, we don't argue the merits of a
case in the press," he said.
In its decision, the San Francisco appeals
court said that Congress waived the
Postal Service's sovereign immunity by
giving it the power to sue and be sued.
And Flamingo added in its filing with
the high court, "no court of appeals has
held that the statutory definition of
'person' excludes all governmental
entities that can sue or be sued."
At least one of the Postal Service's
competitors agreed. Atlanta-based
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United Parcel Service Inc. said it
"believes the [Postal Service] should be
subjected to the same antitrust scrutiny
as the private-sector entities with which
it competes." FedEx Corp., Memphis,
Tenn., declined comment, saying it isn't
familiar with the case.
Copyright @ 2003, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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Also This Term:
02-1348 Olympic Airways v. Husain
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 316 F.3d 829, 71 U.S.L.W. 1379)
Flight attendant's repeated refusal to accommodate asthmatic passenger's request to move
farther from smoking section was "accident" that proximately caused passenger's death
on international flight, thereby triggering liability under Warsaw Convention, and was
"willful misconduct" not protected by convention's liability limits.
Question Presented: Is "accident" condition precedent to air carrier liability for
passenger's death under Article 17 of Warsaw Convention satisfied when passenger's pre-
existing medical condition is aggravated by exposure to normal condition in aircraft
cabin, even if carrier's negligence were link in chain of causation?
02-1196 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Edwards
Ruling Below: (SEC v. ETS Payphones Inc., 11th Cir., 300 F.3d 1281, 71 U.S.L.W.
1152)
Investors who bought pay telephones from promoter and then leased them back to
promoter's company in exchange for fixed monthly fees did not participate in company's
"profits" within meaning of federal securities law, and thus such buy-leaseback
arrangement is not "investment contract" that would qualify as "security" subject to
Securities and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction.
Question Presented: Did court of appeals err in dismissing complaint on ground that
investment scheme is excluded from term "investment contract" in definitions of
"security" in Section 2(a)(1) of 1933 Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of 1934
Securities Exchange Act if promoter promises fixed rather than variable return or if
investor is contractually entitled to particular amount or rate of return?
02-819 Kontrick v. Ryan
Ruling Below: (7th Cir., 295 F.3d 724)
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4004(a) and 4007(c), which require that objection to debtor's discharge in
Chapter 7 liquidation case and complaint to determine dischargeability of debt under
Section 523(c) of Bankruptcy Code be filed no later than 60 days after first date set for
meeting of creditors, are not jurisdictional, but rather are subject to equitable defenses,
including waiver.
Question Presented: Are deadlines established by bankruptcy rules for objecting to
discharge jurisdictional?
392
